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THE UNITED KINGDOM BILL OF RIGHTS 1998:
THE MODERNISATION OF RIGHTS IN THE OLD WORLD
Clive Walker*
Russell L. Weaver**
Into a steadfastly conservative constitutional landscape, the United Kingdom
Parliament has now introduced a Bill of Rights, the Human Rights Act of 1998,
which takes effect in October 2000. The Act provides for a full catalogue of civil
and political rights which are enforceable by the courts. This development raises
two questions in evaluating the future of English law. First, does this signify the
dawn of a new British radicalism? And second, why has it happened now? In
answering these questions in relation to England and Wales, Part I of this Article
provides an introduction to the traditional treatment of rights within the English
legal system through an examination of the background context provided by the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, including its impact on UK. law to date. Part II analyzes the current
substance and future role of the Human Rights Act of 1998. This Part explores
the desirability of incorporating the European Convention, the content of rights
under the Act, the degree of entrenchment of those rights, and the imposition of
duties. Part III then explores the role of the judiciary and its procedures and
various remedies for vindicating these rights. Finally, the Article concludes by
gauging the potential impact of the new Bill of Rights, finding that although the
changes to be brought about by the Human Rights Act of 1998 are certainly an
important development in English law, they will not be as revolutionary in appli-
cation as they might first appear.
INTRODUCTION
Change does not come easily or quickly to the "Old World" ju-
risdictions of the United Kingdom. As is widely known, the
United Kingdom still does not have a written constitution and re-
lies upon traditional or uncodified practices as much as laws.1 An
* Professor of Criminal Justice Studies and Director, Centre for Criminal Justice
Studies, University of Leeds. LL.B. 1975, University of Leeds; Ph.D. 1982, University of Man-
chester. An earlier version of this Article was presented at a staff seminar in February 1999
at the South Texas College of Law, A&M University, Houston, Texas. Both authors thank
the College for its generous hospitality.
** Professor of Law, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville. BA.
1974, University of Missouri-Columbia;J.D. 1978, University of Missouri-Columbia School of
Law.
1. See generally GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE RULES
AND FORMS OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY (1984); Neil MacCormick, Does the United King-
dom Have a Constitution? Reflections on MacCormick v. Lord Advocate, 29 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 1
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illustration of this approach lies in England's treason laws. Despite
calls by law reform bodies to revise thoroughly the treason laws,'
they have remained largely unaltered. Even when the recent Crime
and Disorder Act of 19983 amended ancient treason legislation by
abolishing the death penalty for peacetime treason, the opportu-
nity was not taken for a more thorough revision. Similarly, the
powers of local justices under the Justices of the Peace Act of 13614
to bind over "ne'er do wells" to keep the Queen's Peace also re-
mains intact, although it has been the subject of two recent
decisions by the European Court of Human Rights.! Unlike the
United States Supreme Court,6 the European Court of Human
Rights, also referred to as the "Strasbourg Court," refused to con-
(1978); Frederick F. Ridley, There Is No British Constitution: A Dangerous Case of the Emperor's New
Clothes, 41 PARLIAMENTARY Ar. 340 (1988).
2. See generally THE ENGLAND & WALES LAW COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER No. 72,
TREASON, SEDITION AND ALLIED OFFENCES (1977); Leonard H. Leigh, Law Reform and the
Law of Treason and Sedition, 1977 PUB. L. 128.
3. Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, c. 37, § 36 (Eng.) ("(1) In section I of the Treason
Act (Ireland) 1537 (practising any harm etc. to, or slandering, the King, Queen or heirs
apparent punishable as high treason), for the words 'have and suffer such pains of death
and' there shall be substituted the words 'be liable to imprisonment for life and to such' ").
4. Justices of the Peace Act, 1361, 34 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.). The Act states:
First, that in every County of England shall be assigned for the keeping of the Peace,
one Lord, and with him three or four of the most worthy in the County, with some
learned in the Law, and they shall have Power to restrain the Offenders, Rioters, and
all other Barators and to pursue, arrest, take, and chastise them according to their
Trespass or Offence; and to cause them to be imprisoned and duly punished accord-
ing to the Law and Customs of the Realm, and according to that which to them shall
seem best to do by their Discretions and good Advisement;... and to take and arrest
all those that they may find by Indictment, or by Suspicion, and to put them in
Prison; and to take of all them that be [not] of good Fame, where they shall be
found, sufficient Surety and Mainprise of their good Behaviour towards the King and
his People, and the other duly to punish; to the Intent that the People be not by such
Rioters or Rebels troubled nor endamaged, nor the Peace blemished, nor Merchants
nor other passing by the Highways of the Realm disturbed, nor [put in the Peril
which may happen] of such offenders.
Id.
5. See Hashman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25594/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999),
http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/Judgments.htm; McLeod v. United Kingdom, App. No.
24755/94, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493 (1998); see also U.K. in Human Rights Breach Over Orders
Binding Over Hunt Saboteurs, TIMES (London), Dec. 1, 1999, at 43 (reporting that U.K held
in breach of the protection of freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European
Convention for binding over two hunt saboteurs contra bonos mores) [hereinafter Hunt Sabo-
teurs]; Violation of Wife's Home in Enforcing Husband's Court Order, TIMES (London), Oct. 1,
1998, at 43 (reporting that Court found the use of binding over to keep the peace in some
cases to be a disproportionate response in view of the value of freedom of expression under
Article 10 of the European Convention).
6. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 518-20 (1972) (finding a Georgia statute,
which made it an offense to use "opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a
breach of the peace" unconstitutionally vague and overbroad).
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demn the concept of "breach of the peace" as so intractably vague
as to be beyond the concept of due process.7 The Strasbourg
Court, however, did find fault with the alternative basis of behavior
"contra bonos mores," and more generally has expressed concerns
about the proportionality of policing actions under this power."
Into this steadfastly conservative constitutional landscape, the
United Kingdom Parliament has now introduced a Bill of Rights,
the Human Rights Act of 1998,1° which will take effect in October
2000. The Act provides for a full catalogue of civil and political
rights that are enforceable by the courts. This development raises
two questions in evaluating the future of English law. First, does
this signify the dawn of a new British radicalism? And second, why
has it happened now? In answering these questions in relation to
England and Wales," Part I of this Article provides an introduction
7. Steel v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24838/94, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 603, 607 (1998);
see also Hunt Saboteurs, supra note 5. No legislative reform is forthcoming, despite the call for
abolition of the 1361 Act by the Law Commission in LAW COMMISSION, BINDING OVER,
1994, Cm. 2439, at 81.
8. Hashman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25594/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999), http://
www.echr.coe.int/eng/Judgments.htm; see also Hunt Saboteurs, supra note 5 (stating behavior
contra bonos mores has been described as conduct that has the property of being "'wrong
rather than right in the judgment of the majority of contemporary fellow citizens'"
(quoting Hughes v. Holley, 86 Crim. App. R. 130, 139 (1988))).
9. See, e.g., McLeod v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24755/94, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493
(1998); Hunt Saboteurs, supra note 5.
10. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). According to the Preamble, this is "[an Act
to give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention
on Human Rights; to make provision with respect to holders of certain judicial offices who
become judges of the European Court of Human Rights; and for connected purposes." Id.
See generally THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 (Lammy Betten ed., 1999) (analyzing problems
with incorporating the Human Rights Bill into English law); DEBORAH CHENEY ET AL.,
CRIMINALJUSTICE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 (1999) (exploring the implications of
the Act on the criminal justice system in England);JASON COPPEL, THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
1998: ENFORCING THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION IN THE DOMESTIC COURTS (1999) (detailing
everyday legal practice implications of the Act for practitioners); HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND
PRACTICE (Lord Anthony Lester & David Pannick eds., 1999) (explaining the background,
content, and application of the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act of 1998 and the
European Convention); THE IMPACT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILL ON ENGLISH LAW (Basil
S. Markesinis ed., 1998) (discussing the relationship between the Human Rights Bill and
European common law systems); KEIR STARMER, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (1999)
(analyzing the Human Rights Act in comparison to the European Convention);JoHN WAD-
HAM & HELEN MOUNTFIELD, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 (1999)
(examining legal issues arising from the Act, providing a guide to Strasbourg case law on
rights in the Act, and explaining new procedures to bring a case at Strasbourg); Keith D.
Ewing, The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy, 62 MoD. L. REV. 79 (1999)
(discussing the extent to which the Human Rights Bill shifts political power to the English
judiciary); Home Office Human Rights Unit, at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/hract/
hrmenu.htm (providing general information on the implementation of the Human Rights
Act).
11. For a discussion of these questions as they pertain to Northern Ireland and Scot-
land (and Wales), see generally HUMAN RIGHTS LAw AND PRACTICE, supra note 10.
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to the traditional treatment of rights within the English legal sys-
tem through an examination of the background context provided
by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, 2 including its impact on U.K. law to
date. Part II analyzes the current substance and future role of the
Human Rights Act of 1998.13 It explores the desirability of incorpo-
rating the European Convention, the content of rights under the
Act, the degree of entrenchment of those rights, and the imposi-
tion of duties. Part III then explores the role of the judiciary and
its procedures and various remedies vindicating these rights. Fi-
nally, the Article concludes by gauging the potential impact of the
new Bill of Rights, finding that although the changes to be
brought about by the Human Rights Act of 1998 are certainly an
important development in English law, they will not be as revolu-
tionary in application as they might first appear.
14
I. CONTEXTUALIZATION OF THE REFORMS
The United Kingdom does not share the recent history of coun-
tries such as Poland 5 and South Africa 16 that are now emerging
12. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter Convention or
European Convention]. See generally DAVIDJ. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CON-
VENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1995) (reviewing the law developed by the European
Convention and enforcement procedures); HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN CONVEN-
TION: THE EFFECTS OF THE CONVENTION ON THE UNITED KINGDOM AND IRELAND (Brice
Dickson ed., 1997) (surveying cases concerning the Convention that originated in the
United Kingdom and were heard at the European Court and cases where the Convention
has been cited in the United Kingdom's courts); FRANCIS G. JACOBS & ROBIN C.A. WHITE,
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1996) (providing a historical backdrop
for the European Convention and analyzing the language protecting the enumerated
rights); MARK JANIS ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (1995) (analyzing the history
leading to the European Convention and the protection of the enumerated rights); P. VAN
DIJR & GJ.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HU-
MAN RIGHTS (3d ed. 1998) (analyzing the European Convention and its enumerated rights
and procedures).
13. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
14. But cf Dr. Geoffrey Marshall, On Constitutional Theory, in 3 THE IMPACT OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS BILL ON ENGLISH LAW: THE CLIFFORD CHANCE LECTURES 15, 15 (Basil S.
Markesinis ed., 1998) (suggesting that "the impact on constitutional theory is nil").
15. For some of the problems arising from a repressive past, see Sk6rkiewicz v. Poland,
App. No. 39860/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999), http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/Judgments.htm
(decision as to admissibility); Stanislaw Domalewski v. Poland, App. No. 34610/97 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1999), http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/Judgments.hin (decision as to admissibility).
16. Much of the controversy around the building of a new polity has been based
around the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. See generally Azanian Peoples Org. and
Others v. President of RSA 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC); Ian Liebenberg, The Truth and Recon-
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from dark, repressive pasts and are seeking to lift their collective
heads up into the shining light of liberal democracy. Of course,
there are some commentators who view former Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher as a figure of repression, having destroyed the
traditional constitution, and therefore attribute the new Bill of
Rights to her misdeeds.17 In reality, the shift toward a comprehen-
sive bill of rights has been a more gradual and more positive
experience than simply a reaction to a bad political trip.'
In England and Wales, there has been a long and fairly consis-
tent legal adherence to rights.' 9 The statements of these rights are
scattered across various statutes and common law rules and have
no higher normative status than other laws.2° In addition, these
"rights" have been construed more narrowly than in the United
States.2 ' Nevertheless, there is a long history of individual rights in
the English constitution, just as there is a long and well-trodden
history of treason and justices of the peace. This history includes
such famous declarations as the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right
of 1627, and the Bill of Rights of 1688,22 all of which have operated
as important symbolic gestures. But none has ever delivered a
comprehensive statement of enforceable rights similar to the U.S.
model, and, as they stand today, they contain relatively little that
has been left to speak to the pressures and problems of the con-
temporary age. By illustration, in regard to the Magna Carta,2'
only two important provisions are left. One is chapter 42 of the
1215 Charter, by which "[i]t shall be lawful in [the] future for
ciliation Commission in South Africa, 11 S. AFR. PUB. L. 123 (1996); Promotion of National
Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, available at http://www.truth.org.za.
17. See generally KEITH D. EWING & CONOR D. GEARTY, FREEDOM UNDER THATCHER
(1990); CONOR FOLEY, HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN WRONGS (1995); IAN HARDEN & NORMAN
LEWIS, THE NOBLE LIE (1986).
18. See infra Part I.C.
19. See DAVID FELDMAN, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ENGLAND AND
WALES 60-75 (1993) (discussing the evolution of the United Kingdom's approach to pro-
tection of individual rights);James Michael, Privacy, in INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE LAW IN
BRITAIN 265 (Christopher McCrudden & Gerald Chambers eds., 1994) (discussing informa-
tion privacy as an aspect of the general right to privacy).
20. SeegenerallyJOSEPHJACONELLI, ENACTING A BILL OF RIGHTS (1980).
21. See Russell L. Weaver & Geoffrey Bennett, Is the New York Times "Actual Malice"
Standard Really Necessary? A Comparative Perspective, 53 LA. L. REV. 1153, 1159-64 (1993). See
generally Russell L. Weaver & GeoffreyJ.G. Bennett, Broadcasting Bans: A Transatlantic Perspec-
tive, 13 MEDIA L. 179 (1992); Russell L. Weaver & Geoffrey J.G. Bennett, Defamation and
EditorialDecisionmaking, 14 MEDIA L. 2 (1993).
22. Magna Carta, 1297, 25 Edw. 25, c. 1-37 (Eng.); Petition of Right, 1627, 3 Car. 1, c. I
(Eng.); Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 W. & M. 1, sess. 2, c. 2 (Eng.), available at http://portico.bl.uk.
See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND (1992) (discussing the
significant influence that English human rights history had on the development of the
American Bill of Rights).
23. Magna Carta, supra note 22.
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anyone to leave our kingdom, and to return safe and sound by
land and by water.., except for a short space in time of war .... ,24
The other is chapter 29 of the 1297 Charter, which provides that
"[n] o freeman shall be taken or imprisoned [but] ... by the law of
the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any
man either justice or right."2 5 There is some doubt as to whether
chapter 42 remains in force because it was not repeated in 1297.
Chapter 29, however, has been cited in some relatively recent
cases. 26 The Petition of Right has not been cited in any reported
case post-1945. The Bill of Rights of 1688, however, remains an
important part of the architecture in the relationship between Par-
liament and the Crown, especially articles 1, 2, and 4, concerning
the suspension of legislation and the exclusive parliamentary
power to tax,2 7 article 9, concerning free speech in Parliament, 2
and article 13, concerning frequent meetings of Parliament.
29
Some parts of the Bill of Rights attend to individual rather than
institutional rights. For example, article 3 forbids the improper use
of ecclesiastical courts; 0 article 5 conveys the right to petition the
King;3' article 7 allows Protestant subjects to carry firearms;2 article
24. Magna Carta, 1215, 17John 1, c. 42 (Eng.), available at http://portico.bl.uk.
25. Magna Carta, supra note 22, at c. 23-33.
26. See, e.g., Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Phansopkar, 1976
Q.B. 606, 626-28 (Eng. C.A.) (listing chapter 29 of the Magna Carta among relevant sources
in holding that the wife of a patrial of the United Kingdom was en.titled as of right to enter
the United Kingdom upon proof of the marriage).
27. Bill of Rights, 1688, at art. 1, 2, 4. Article I states "[tihat the pretended Power of
Suspending of Laws or the Execution of Laws by Regall Authority without Consent of Par-
lyament is illegall." Id. at art 1. Article 2 states "[tihat the pretended Power of Dispensing
with Laws or the Execution of Laws by Regall Authoritie, as it hath been assumed and exer-
cised of late, is illegall." Id. at art. 2. Article 4 states "[tihat levying Money for or to the Use
of the Crown by p [re] tence of Prerogative, without Grant of Parlyament, for longer time, or
in other manner then the same is or shall be granted, is Illegal." Id. at art 4. These powers
have given rise to occasional litigation. See, e.g., Congreve v. Home Office, 1976 Q.B. 629,
630 (Eng. C.A.) (finding the Home Secretary's discretion to revoke a television receiver
licence limited if exercised arbitrarily or improperly).
28. Article 9 states "[tihat the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Par-
liament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament."
Bill of Rights 1688, at art 9.
29. Article 13 states "that for redress of all grievances, and for the amending, strength-
ening and preserving of the laws, Parliaments ought to be held frequently." Id. at art. 13; see
also ROBERT BLACKBURN, THE MEETING OF PARLIAMENT (1990) (discussing the law and
practice relating to the frequency and duration of Parliament sessions).
30. Bill of Rights, 1688, at art. 3. Article 3 states "[t]hat the commission for erecting the
late Court of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes and all other commissions and courts
of like nature, are illegal and pernicious." Id.
31. Article 5 states "[that it is the right of the subjects to petition the king, and all
commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal." Id. at art. 5.
32. Article 7 states "[t]hat the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their
defence suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law". Id. at art. 7; see also Firearms Act,
[VOL. 33:4
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8 provides for free elections;33 article 10 allows for bail and fines in
criminal cases and forbids the use of cruel and unusual punish-
ments;3 4 and article 11 grants the right to ajury trial.3 But these
resounding declarations, which also achieved some reverbera-
tions in the United States, are now viewed in their country of
36origin as either hopelessly archaic or at best stop-gap measures.
In the absence of a comprehensive legislated statement of
rights, it was therefore left to the judges to fill in the gaps by way
of common law principles. They occasionally obliged with ring-
ing phrases about the rejection of claims to state necessity,37 the
restrictive interpretation of penal statutes,35 and the recognition
of the values of liberty, 9 speech, and property. 41 However, the
English judiciary found it very difficult to impart a clear and
comprehensive picture, as is frequently the problem with com-
mon law developments. Such "rights" were constructed in
negative rather than positive terms. 4' Furthermore, although
there was considerable interest in developing constitutional
principles as a partial bill of rights, 4 3 the judiciary refused to be
1968, c. 27 (Eng.); Firearms (Amendment) Act, 1997, c. 5 (Eng.) (prohibiting the private
possession of handguns).
33. Bill of Rights, 1688, at art. 8. Article 8 states "[t]hat election of members of Parlia-
ment ought to be free." Id. The regulation of elections is now mainly governed by the
Representation of the People Act. Representation of the People Act, 1983, c. 2 (Eng.).
34. Bill of Rights, 1688, at art. 10. Article 10 states "[t]hat excessive bail ought not to be
required nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.; see
also Bail Act, 1976, c. 63 (Eng.). See generally Williams v. Home Office (No. 2), 1 All E.R. 1211
(1981) (dismissing action, which invoked article 10, for damages for false imprisonment, as
well as claim for declaration that Secretary of State was acting ultra vires); Regina v. Secretary
of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Herbage, 1987 Q.B. 872 (finding cruel and unusual
punishment where one, who suffered from physical disabilities but was of sound mind, was
detained in prison's hospital wing in close proximity to mentally disturbed inmates).
35. Bill of Rights, 1688, at art. 11. Article 11 states "[t]hatjurors ought to be duly impan-
elled and returned, and jurors which [sic] pass upon men in trials for high treason ought to
be freeholders." Id.; see alsoJuries Act, 1974, c. 23 (Eng.).
36. See DAVID FELDMAN, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES
61 (1993) (noting that "to say that they offer effective protection to rights ignores the reality
of modern, and perhaps pre-modern, legislation and administration.").
37. SeeEntick v. Carrington, 45 Eng. Rep. 807 (RB. 1765).
38. SeeSweetv. Parsley, 1970 A.C. 132, 153; Regina v. Reah, 1 W.L.R. 1508 (1968).
39. See Christie v. Leachinsky, 1947 A.C. 573, 581-82.
40. See Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Brind, 1 All E.R. 469,
476-78 (1990).
41. See Central Control v. Cannon Brewery Co. Ltd., 1919 A.C. 744, 747, 754.
42. Compare Hubbard v. Pitt, 1976 Q.B. 142, 143, 158 (granting an injunction, where
no trade dispute existed, preventing picketers from protesting the redevelopment of prop-
erty), with Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, 456 U.S. 212, 218 (1982) (recognizing
the right to free speech includes political protests, although not finding the boycott in ques-
tion to be political speech).
43. See generally Trevor R.S. Allan, Legislature Supremacy and the Rule of Law, 44 CAM-
BRIDGE L.J. 111 (1985); Lord Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson, The Infiltration of a Bill of Rights,
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truly radical and entirely rejected, for example, the concepts of a
right to privacy.44 Nor was there any willingness within English
law to impose restraints on legislative "Elective Dictatorship."46
A. The European Convention and Its Pre-1998
Act Influence on English Law
In the absence ofjudicial action, another route to the fastening of
liberal values began to emerge after 1950 in the shape of the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. The European Convention is the most im-
portant instrument of international law to emanate from the
Council of Europe47-it is the Council's 'jewel in the crown." 48 The
Convention was drafted in 1949, and English civil servants, reflecting
English common law perceptions of rights, were highly influential in
the process. 9 Since coming into force in 1953, the Convention has
experienced phenomenal growth in its stature in at least three re-
spects. First, the substantive rights have been augmented by a
number of Protocols to the Convention, especially the First,50
1992 PUB. L. 397; Keith D. Ewing, New Constitutional Constraints in Australia, 1993 PUB. L.
250; Sir John Law, Is the High Court the Guardian of Fundamental Rights?, 1993 PUB. L. 93;
Hoong P. Lee, The Australian High Court and Implied Fundamental Guarantees, 1993 PUB. L.
606.
44. Malone v. Metropolitan Police Comm'r (No. 2), 1979 Ch. 344, 372-75 (Eng.).
45. But see Oppenheimer v. Cattermole, 1976 A.C. 249 (Eng.).
46. This phrase is taken from LORD HAILSHAM, THE DILEMMA OF DEMOCRACY 9
(1978). It points to the danger that the United Kingdom Parliament is dominated effectively
by the government of the day (and even the party machinery from which the government
springs), and rights and other constitutional features, therefore, can be altered by legisla-
tion motivated by sectional interests.
47. For a full list of treaties, see http://www.coe.fr/cm/site2/ref/dynamic/
ftreaties.asp. According to Article 1 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, "[t ] he aim of the
Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safe-
guarding and realising the ideals and principles which [sic] are their common heritage and
facilitating their economic and social progress." Statute of the Council of Europe, 1949,
Europ. T.S. No. 1, at art. 1.
48. Lord Lester, European Human Rights and the British Constitution, in THE CHANGING
CONSTITUTION 33 (JeffreyJowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 1994).
49. See supra note 12. The Convention was finalized in 1950, with the United Kingdom
as an original signatory and ratifying state in 1951.
50. First Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, Europ. T.S. No. 9 (protecting
the right to possess property, the right to an education, and the right to vote in a free elec-
tion by secret ballot) [hereinafter First Protocol].
[VOL. 33:4
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Fourth, 5' Sixth,2 and Seventh.53 Second, the number of states
adhering to the Convention has grown, especially in recent years
with the accession of many Eastern European states, growing from
twenty-three in 1989 to forty-one in 1998. Third, the workload, be-
cause of the gradual increase in the recognition of and reliance on
the exceptional right of individuals to file petitions, has broadened
considerably. This right was granted to applicants in the United
Kingdom in 1966.
The rights contained in the Convention are civil and political
rights, though there is a separate European Social Charter.5' The
civil and political rights are both substantive and procedural, in-
cluding liberty, fair trials, privacy, and free expression.56 Some have
argued that the Convention bodies have been more sure-footed
when dealing with procedure; 57 certainly, matters of substantive
decision are often avoided by reference to the concept of a
"margin of appreciation" by which the Convention adjudicators
defer to the greater knowledge and experience of domestic deci-
sion makers. 58 Thus the prime protectors and overseers of human
rights continue to be the national authorities, and the Convention
does not act as a vehicle to de novo appeal.
The actual and potential impact of the Convention on English
law has also been limited by other considerations. One is that the
Convention was drafted as a lowest common denominator of rights
observance within Western Europe, and so its standards were set at
a deliberately modest level to encourage compliance and avoid
conflicts with contracting states protective of their sovereignty. 5 In
51. Fourth Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 16, 1963, Europ. T.S. No. 46, 7 I.L.M. 978 (entered into
force May 2, 1968) (protecting citizens' liberty of movement and prohibiting the parties
from expelling nationals from their states) [hereinafter Fourth Protocol].
52. Sixth Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Apr. 28, 1983, Europ. T.S. No. 114 (entered into force Mar. 1,
1985) (concerning the abolition of the death penalty) [hereinafter Sixth Protocol].
53. Seventh Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 22, 1984, Europ. T.S. No. 117 (entered into force
Nov. 1, 1988) (protecting the right to appeal a criminal conviction, the right not to be tried
twice for the same offense, and the equality of rights of private law for spouses) [hereinafter
Seventh Protocol].
54. See Lord Anthony Lester, U.K. Acceptance of the Strasbourg Jurisdiction: What Really
Went on in Whitehall in 1965, 1998 PUB. L. 237, 252-53.
55. European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, Europ. T.S. No. 35.
56. See infra pp. 10-13 for a detailed explanation.
57. See Conor A. Gearty, The European Court of Human Rights and the Protection of Civil
Liberties: An Overview, 52 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 89, 98, 125 (1993).
58. See generally HOWARD C. YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN
THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996).
59. See Lester, supra note 54, at 244-47.
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addition, the substantive rights in the Convention are, for the most
part, akin to, or even expressly based on, rights recognized implic-
itly or expressly in English common law.60
At the same time, the potential for invocation of the Convention
is tremendous, especially as the adjudicative agencies adopt a
teleological and dynamic approach in order to realize the funda-
mental objects and purposes of the Convention in a changing
world, namely the protection of individual human rights and the
promotion of pluralistic democracy.6' Approximately one hundred
cases concerning the United Kingdom have been referred to the
European Court of Human Rights, and adverse judgments have
prompted some profound changes in law. 62 For example, Article 2
of the Convention, concerning the right to life and which gov-
erned the adverse judgment in McCann v. United Kingdom,64
involving the shooting of I.R.A. suspects by the British Army in Gi-
braltar, requires greater circumspection in the planning and
operation of law enforcement activities which involve the use of
deadly force by suspects or law enforcement agents. Several cases
centering around Article 3, the right not to be subjected to torture
or inhuman or degrading treatment,65 have also arisen from the
conflict in Northern Ireland, including the interstate case of Ire-
land v. United Kingdom 66 Cases under Article 5,67 the right to liberty
60. Id. at 240-44.
61. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 2, 34, 36.
62. See SUE FARRAN, THE U.K. BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1-18
(1996).
63. The right to life provision states:
[e]veryone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his
life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his convic-
tion of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. (2) Deprivation of life shall
not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the
use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person
from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape
of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling
a riot or insurrection.
European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 2.
64. App. No. 18984/91, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97 (1996).
65. European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 3 ("No one shall be subjected to torture
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.").
66. App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1980) (discussing the use of interrogation
techniques such as hooding, deprivation of sleep, prolonged wall-standing, and strict diet
against I.R.A. suspects in Northern Ireland); see e.g. Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No.
14038/88, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989) (extraditing a prisoner to Virginia, U.S.A., possibly
to death row); Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1980)
(discussing as a form of punishment birching, now abolished by the Criminal Justice Act of
1993 (Isle of Man)).
67. Article 5 of the European Convention states:
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and security of person, have involved complaints about the recall
of prisoners released on license, the length of detention in police
68
custody, and breach of the peace. Fairness under Article 6, 6" the
(1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall
be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance
with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a per-
son after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or
detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a
court or in order to secure the fulfillment of any obligation prescribed
by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the
purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on rea-
sonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is
reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence
or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful
order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful deten-
tion for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal
authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the
spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcohol-
ics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a
person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country
or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to depor-
tation or extradition.
(2) Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language
which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge
against him.
(3) Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 1.c of this article shall be brought promptly before a judge
or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall
be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.
Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
(4) Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be
entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention
shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the de-
tention is not lawful.
(5) Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contraven-
tion of the provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to
compensation.
European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 5.
68. See Hussain v. United Kingdom, App. No. 21928/93, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 1 (1996)
(reviewing mandatory sentence of detention "during Her Majesty's pleasure"); Thynne v.
United Kingdom, App. Nos. 11787/85, 11978/86, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 666 passim (1990)
(reviewing indeterminate life sentence); Brogan v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 11209/84,
11234/84, 11266/84, 11386/85, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117 passim (1989) (reviewing detention
by the police without judicial authorisation lasting over four days); Weeks v. United King-
dom, App. No. 9787/82, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 293 passim (1988) (reviewing recall of prisoner
released on license).
69. Article 6 of the European Convention states:
(1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any crimi-
nal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal es-
tablished by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press
and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests
of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society,
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right to due process, applies to both pretrial process and trial
procedures.7 0  Rights to privacy under Article 871 have been
fiercely litigated in the fields of correspondence 72 and sexual rela-
71tions. Cases involving the application of contempt of court
where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of
the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion
of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice
the interests ofjustice.
(2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent
until proved guilty according to law.
(3) Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum
rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands
and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b)
to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to
be given it free when the interests ofjustice so require; (d) to examine or
have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as wit-
nesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he
cannot understand or speak the language used in court.
European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 6.
70. See, e.g., Venables v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 24724/94, 24888/94 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1999), http://www.echr.coe.int (holding breach of Article 6 for trial of children in an
adult court); Saunders v. United Kingdom, App. No. 19187/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313, 327-
31 (1997) (holding violation of Article 6(1) for use of coerced statements in criminal trial);
Benham v. United Kingdom, App. No. 19380/92, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 293, 307-10 (1996)
(holding violation of Article 6 for refusal of legal aid by magistrates for a poll tax defaulter);
Campbell v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 7819/77, 7878/77, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 165, 205
(1985) (finding breach of Article 6 for denying access by prisoners to legal advice); Silver v.
United Kingdom, App. Nos. 5947/72, 6205/73, 7052/75, 7061/75, 7107/75, 7113/75,
71361/75, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 347, 370-71 (1983) (same); Golder v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 4451/70, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 524, 541 (1979) (finding breach of Article 6 for interference
with correspondence between prisoner and lawyer); Daniel McGory, Silence of Boys Who
Killed Without Reason, TIMES (London), Dec. 17, 1999, at 8 (discussing the trial of children
in an adult court).
71. Article 8 of the European Convention states:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is neces-
sary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of
disorder of crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 8.
72. See, e.g., Halford v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20605/92, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 523,
533-37 (1997); Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14, 38-47
(1985) (holding breach of Article 8 for the tapping of telephone communications without
legislative authority).
73. See, e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149,
149 (1981) (holding that rights to privacy were infringed by making homosexuality a crimi-
nal offence in Northern Ireland); see also Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom, App. Nos.
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restriction 7 4 and attempts to impose official secrecy 75 have arisen
under Article 10.7
As far as English law is concerned, these judgments and deci-
sions are viewed as essentially declaratory of international law; they
cannot directly affect the status of domestic laws or decisions un-
der them. However, the United Kingdom, as a contracting state
wishing to remain a party to the Convention, invariably has re-
sponded to adverse decisions and awards as it is required to do
under Article 13 of the Convention, though not always as expected
or with alacrity." The result has been several important pieces of
legislation favoring rights that create a more direct link between
71English law and the European Convention.
31417/96, 32377/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999), http://www.ehcr.coe.int (holding that appli-
cants' discharge from the armed forces violated Article 8 of the Convention); Smith and
Grady v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 33985/96, 33986/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R_ 1999), http://
www.ehcr.coe.int (holding investigation and discharge from the Royal Air Force on the sole
ground of homosexuality violated Article 8 of the Convention); Sutherland v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 25186/94 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R. 1997), http://www.echr.coe.int (holding violation
of Article 8 for maintaining higher minimum age of consent for male homosexual acts than for
male heterosexuality); Armed Forces Homosexual Policy Offends Human Right TIMES (London),
Oct. 11, 1999, at 27 (discussing the acceptance of homosexuals within the armed forces).
74. See, e.g., Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep.
245, 268-82 (1979) (finding that an injunction to prevent the publication of materials that
would be in contempt of court was in breach of Article 10).
75. See, e.g., Observer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13585/88, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 153,
174-83 (1991) (holding that the application of contempt of court to prevent the publica-
tion of materials that were the subject of an injunction against another newspaper was a
breach of Article 10).
76. Article 10 of the European Convention, states:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and
ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of fron-
tiers....
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and respon-
sibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic soci-
ety in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety,
for the prevention of disorder of crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for pre-
venting the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 10.
77. See, e.g., Brogan v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 11209/84, 11234/84, 11266/84,
11386/85, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117, 128-39 (1989) (reviewing detention by the police without
judicial authorisation lasting over four days). This case resulted in the derogation now set out
schedule 3 of in the Human Rights Act of 1998. It will be withdrawn when the Terrorism Act
2000 (c. 11) comes into force (which is expected to be in early 2001), since schedule 8 will
requirejudicial authorisation for detention beyond a certain number of days.
78. See, e.g., Contempt of Court Act, 1981, c. 49 (Eng.), following the case of Evans v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245 (1979) and the Interception of
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Furthermore, English courts have, to some extent, used the
Convention as an aid to statutory interpretation. This approach
has been taken readily where the statute was intended to imple-
ment the Convention. In addition, the rule that judges prefer an
interpretation that renders English law compliant with the interna-
tional law represented by the Convention, rather than one that
results in an apparent breach of the Convention, further linked
80English law with the Convention. If, however, English law was
clearly at variance with the Convention, the position before 1998
was that the statute simply applied;8 ' there was no need to look at
the Convention if the English statute was clear.s2 In addition,
courts accepted that this approach applied at the level of judicial
interpretation. There was no corresponding requirement at a
lower level in the administrative hierarchy, however, for officials
expressly to consider the Convention when exercising their discre-
• 83
tion. The position was even less promising with regard to the
common law. No rule of interpretation was asserted clearly about
how to achieve compliance, though several judges viewed the Con-
vention as based on principles wholly consistent with, and
Communications Act, 1985, c. 56 (Eng.). The later act followed the case of Malone v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 (1985).
79. See, e.g., Regina v. McCormick, [1977] N.I. 105, 1971-1983 THE IRISH DIGEST, at
col. 276 (Earnan P. DeBlaghd, ed.) (interpreting provisions in the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act of 1973, relating to the admissibility of statements from detain-
ees, Article 3 being the operative standard).
80. See generally MURRAY HUNT, USING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS
(1997); Michael J. Beloff & Helen Mountfield, Unconventional Behaviour?Judicial Uses of the
European Convention in England and Wales, 1996 EUR. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 467.
81. See Waddington v. Miah, 1 W.L.R. 683, 690-92 (1974) (holding that the Immigra-
tion Act of 1971, §§ 24(1)(a) and 26(1)(d), were not retroactive, giving brief consideration
to the Convention principles).
82. See Regina v. Staines, 2 Crim. App. R. 426, 440-44 (1997) (allowing the use of evi-
dence coerced under statutory requirement even though such evidence would not be
allowed in the European Court of Human Rights); Regina v. Ministry of Defense ex parte
Smith, 2 W.L.R. 305, 326-27 (1996) (upholding the dismissal of homosexuals from the
armed forces according to domestic policy despite the Convention); Regina v. General
Med. Council ex parte Colman, 1 All E.R. 489, 505 (1990) (imposing restrictions on doctors'
advertising by the General Medical Council pursuant to authority under an unambiguous
act, rejecting that the act was subject to the Convention); Regina v. Secretary of State for the
Home Dep't ex parte Brind, 1 All ER. 469, 477-78, 484 (1990) (interpreting statute banning
interviews with representatives of specified political groups in Northern Ireland without
considering the Convention to be relevant).
83. See, e.g., Regina v. Home Sec'y ex parte Kirkwood, 2 All E.R. 390, 394-95 (Q.B.
1984) (holding that the English court had no power to grant an injunction against an offi-
cer of the Crown and when exercising his powers under the 1870 Extradition Act that the
Secretary of State was not obliged to consider the provisions of the Convention); Regina v.
Chief Immigration Officer ex parte Salamat Bibi, 1 W.L.R. 979, 984-85 (C.A. 1976) (holding
that immigration officers could not be expected to apply the European Convention on
Human Rights in the exercise of their powers).
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influenced by, the English common law and were therefore pre-
pared to consider Strasbourg jurisprudence in their own
84development of the common law. However, the approach was
variable and depended on judicial predilections toward rights, with
conflicts between courts, as well as between judges in the same
court.8 5 Despite all the difficulties, the Convention was cited in a
significant number of cases, many of which were high profile. 8
The third link between the Convention and English law has
been through the operation of European Communities law, which
is expressly part of English law according to sections 2 and 3 of the
European Communities Act of 1972.87 In its 1974 ruling in Nold v.
84. See, e.g., Att'y Gen. v. Brit. Broad. Corp., 1981 A.C. 303, 332 (considering the Con-
vention during proceedings for an injunction to restrain defendants from broadcasting a
program dealing with matters related to a pending appeal).
85. See Rantzen v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd., 1994 Q.B. 670, 684-86, 692
(discussing the relevance of the Convention to the level of damages in libel); Derbyshire
County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., 2 W.L.R. 449, 459-60 (H.L. 1993) (discussing the
relevance of the Convention to the liability of public authorities).
86. See generally, HUNT, supra note 80; R. SINGH, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM (1997); Beloff& Mountfield, supra note 80.
87. European Communities Act, 1972, c. 68 (Eng.). Section 2 states:
(1) All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from
time to time created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such
remedies and procedures from time to time provided for by or under
the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are without further en-
actment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall
be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and fol-
lowed accordingly; and the expression "enforceable Community right"
and similar expressions shall be read as referring to one to which this
subsection applies.
(2) Subject to Schedule 2 to this Act, at any time after its passing Her Maj-
esty may by Order in Council, and any designated Minister or
department may by regulations, make provision-
(a) for the purpose of implementing any Community obligation of
the United Kingdom, or enabling any such obligation to be im-
plemented, or of enabling any rights enjoyed or to be enjoyed
by the United Kingdom under or by virtue of the Treaties to be
exercised; or
(b) for the purpose of dealing with matters arising out of or related to
any such obligation or rights or the coming into force, or the op-
eration from time to time, of subsection (1) above; and in the
exercise of any statutory power or duty, including any power to
give directions or to legislate by means of orders, rules, regulations
or other subordinate instrument, the person entrusted with the
power or duty may have regard to the objects of the Communities
and to any such obligation or rights as aforesaid ....
Id. § 2.
Section 3 states:
(1) For the purposes of all legal proceedings any question as to the mean-
ing or effect of any of the Treaties, or as to the validity, meaning or
effect of any Community instrument, shall be treated as a question of
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E. C. Commission,8 the European Court of Justice recognized that,
as all members of the European Communities had also ratified the
Convention, the latter should be considered when interpreting
Community law. This rule has been applied on a wide basis, not
just in relation to Community law directly but also in relation to
indirect impacts upon Community law. 9 The Convention has also
been recognized in the Maastricht Treaty, Article F2, and the Am-
sterdam Treaty as a fundamental principle that member states
must observe on pain of suspension. 9 In 1996, however, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice concluded that the European Communities
are not competent to accede directly to the Convention.9'
Despite all these connections, the European Convention did not
transmute into a domestic bill of rights and there remained some
specific shortcomings in the United Kingdom's stance, resulting
in continuing pressures for a domestic bill of rights. 92 These
shortcomings included failings in existing law. For example,
judges hesitated to develop rights decisively and were particularly
hesitant about the impact of parliamentary sovereignty. 93 Even
law (and, if not referred to the European Court, be for determination
as such in accordance with the principles laid down by and any relevant
decision of the European Court).
(2) Judicial notice shall be taken of the Treaties, of the Official Journal of
the Communities and of any decision of, or expression of opinion by,
the European Court or any court attached thereto on any such ques-
tion as aforesaid; and the Official Journal shall be admissible as
evidence of any instrument or other act thereby communicated of any
of the Communities or of any Community institution.
Id. § 3.
88. 2 C.M.L.R. 338 (1974) (E.C.J.).
89. See, e.g., Case C-260/89, Ellinki Radiophonia Tileorassi v. Dimotiki Etairia Plirofo-
rissis, 9 E.C.J.R. 123, 123 (1991) (limitations on broadcasting); Case C-5/88, Wauchauf v.
F.R.G., 1989 E.C.R. 2609, 2639 (transfer of milk quotas).
90. See generally LAMMY BAT-rEN & NICK GRIEF, EUROPEAN UNION LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (1999); Madeline Colvin & Peter Noorlander, Human Rights and Accountability After
the Treaty of Amsterdam, 1998 EUR. HUm. RTS. L. REV. 191; Trevor C. Hartley, Constitutional
and InstitutionalAspects of the Maastricht Agreement, 42 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 213 (1993).
91. See Opinion 2/94: Accession by the Community to the Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759, 1789. See generally
Siofra O'Leary, Current Topic: Accession by the European Community to the European Convention
on Human Rights-The Opinion of the EDJ, 1996 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 362; Akos G. Toth,
The European Union and Human Rights: The Way Forward, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 491
(1997).
92. See generally MICHAEL ZANDER, A BILL OF RIGHTS? (Sweet & Maxwell eds., 4th ed.
1997).
93. The old Diceyan mantra still holds sway in internal law, even if it is now eroded in
terms of external relations with the European Union. See generally ALBERT V. DICEY, INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (MacMillan & Co., 10th ed.
1959) (1885). See also Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd., 3
W.L.R. 818 (E.C.J. 1990) (granting an injunction to stop the application of the Merchant
Shipping Act of 1988 against Spanish fishing vessel owners).
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the pressures from the European Convention were far from com-
plete or satisfactory. The list of adverse decisions grew, but only by
about five adverse judgments per year, which is an extremely mod-
est rate for a supreme constitutional court. It is even modest
compared to fellow European states that have domestic constitu-
tional review.
TABLE 1
IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS BY STATE TO 1997"
STATE APPLICATIONS REFERENCES ADVERSE VIOLATION
IN 1994 TO TO JUDGMENTS PER 100,000
EUROPEAN EUROPEAN OF POPULATION
COMMISSION COURT EUROPEAN PER ANNUM
1960-1997 COURT (WORST=I)
Belgium 78 40 24 0.0050 (9)
France 439 99 42 0.0036 (13)
Germany 188 33 14 0.0003 (19)
Italy 507 251 98 0.0065 (6)
Spain 138 19 8 0.0013(16)
U.K. 236 95 47 0.0021 (15)
At the same time, whenever adverse judgments did arise, there
were feelings of dissatisfaction, as they confirmed that English
judges had fallen short of international expectations and that Eng-
lish dirty linen had been washed in Strasbourg and not in London.
But the process often involved long delays through the require-
ment to exhaust domestic remedies under Article 35 of the
Convention and through the slow-moving bureaucracy in Stras-
bourg. In addition, there were often complaints of confusion on
both sides, as the European Court failed fully to understand Eng-
lish legal practices, and English lawyers and politicians failed to
understand Continental versions. As a result, many English lawyers
(and politicians) viewed the Convention as an alien institution
based more on civil than common law notions.95
94. 564 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1995) 101. The final column takes account of the
different population sizes of member states and also the fact that not all member states
allowed individual applications to the adjudicatory system from the same date.
95. These points are all made in RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME: THE HUMAN RGHTS BILL,
1997, Cm. 3782, which is discussed infra notes pp. 23-24. The most serious single conflict
arose over the Gibraltar Three case, which followed representations made by the Foreign
Office and Lord Chancellor's Department. See Francis Gibb, Britain Calls for Reforms to Court
of Human Rights, TIMES (London), Nov. 25, 1996, at 10.
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Finally, political changes began to favor a domestic statement of
rights. Some of the political factors included the reaction to the
greater radicalism, both from the left and the right during the
1970s and 1980s, though much of that radicalism has now long
since dissipated. Other political factors included: a fragmentation
of political allegiances-smaller parties have increased in power,
and some of these, especially the Liberal Party, have long favored a
Bill of Rights; the need to find unifying concepts in the face of
constitutional changes, including the devolution of powers to Scot-
land, Wales, and Northern Ireland; the need to find other
constitutional checks and balances in the face of other constitu-
tional changes, especially the loss of powers of the House of Lords;
and a need to instill a culture of respect in a society that has begun
to perceive itself as multi-ethnic and multi-cultural.96 There are also
some negative factors at work: in particular, the concern that state
interests had expanded into private lives in such areas as welfare
assistance and technology.97
B. Alternatives to a Domestic Bill of Rights
For twenty-five years there has been growing interest in improv-
ing the protection of rights within English law. Enacting a bill of
rights was the leading contender for doing so, but before examin-
ing that strategy in detail, some of the other options should be
scrutinized especially as some were pursued as alternatives before
1998.98
Several alternatives relate to the alteration of the legislative
process to diminish the danger of what Lord Hailsham called
"elective dictatorship," which could substantially threaten rights."m
Suggestions from Lord Hailsham himself included strengthening
the House of Lords as a counterweight to the partisan House of
Commons. Given its lack of democratic credentials, however, the
96. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURES (Robert Hazell ed., 1999) (providing a
study of the first systematic attempt to foresee the full effects of the new British govern-
ment's constitutional reform program).
97. See REPORT OF THE COMMrrIEE ON PRIVACY, 1972, Cmnd. 5012, at 5, 166-67.
98. SeeHOUSE OF LORDS, EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, 1980-
81, at 362. See generally LORD LESLIE SCARMAN, ENGLISH LAW-THE NEW DIRECTION
(Stevens & Sons eds., 1974); ZANDER, supra note 92;John A.G. Griffith, The Political Constitu-
tion, 42 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1979); Anthony Lester, Fundamental Rights: The UK. Isolated, 1984
PUB. L. 46; Lord Dennis Lloyd, Do We Need a Bill of Rights, 39 MOD. L. REV. 121 (1976); Alan
J.M. Milne, Should We Have a Bill of Rights?, 40 MOD. L. REV. 389 (1977).
99. LORD HAILSHAM, THE DILEMMA OF DEMOCRACY: DIAGNOSIS AND PRESCRIPTION 10
(1978).
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House of Lords' political trajectory has moved toward marginaliza-
tion, over the course of the past century.'00 Its record on the
protection of rights also is not markedly different from that of the
House of Commons.'0
Another Parliamentary reform that has been suggested is pre-
legislation scrutiny by a special human rights select committee that
could alert Parliament and the public to any threats. 0 2 Some con-
cessions have been made in this direction, as shall be described in
Part III.D.2. Reforms of the House of Commons would also be ap-
posite, for example, adopting a proportional system of elections,
which would be more likely to produce a "balanced" Commons
where no party retains overall control. Both major political parties,
Conservative and Labour, however, have tended to be wary of this
idea, fearing that it would lead to hobbled government and would
give undue weight to minor parties who would be courted into
forming a coalition.' The issue has now been examined by the
Jenkins Committee, but no date has been set for the implemen-
tation of its suggestions or for a referendum on any proposed
change. In conclusion, there seems to be little enthusiasm for sub-
stantial change that would give rights greater protection within the
parliamentary process.
In addition to institutional reform, there has also been encour-
agement for Parliament because, within its present constitution, it
could be more active in the implementation of rights. From the
perspective of the left, decisions about public interest, public pol-
icy, and the relationship between state and citizen should remain
in the hands of the democratic legislature rather than in those of
the unelected judiciary. Accordingly, if problems arise from prac-
tices relating to telephone tapping,' for example, it would be far
better to pass specific legislation rather than to allow the judiciary
100. SeeHouse of Lords Act, 1999, c. 34 (Eng.); Parliament Act, 1949, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c.
103 (Eng.); Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13 (Eng). But see ROYAL COMMISSION ON
THE REFORM OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, A HOUSE FOR THE FUTURE, 2000, Cm. 4534, at 5
(calling for a human rights committee in a reformed House of Lords).
101. ButseeWarCrimesAct, 1991,c. 13 (Eng.).
102. See DAVID KINLEY, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COMPLIANCE
WITHOUT INCORPORATION 15 (1993); Michael Ryle, Pre-Legislative Scrutiny: A Prophylactic
Approach to Protection of Human Rights, 1994 PUB. L. 192, 193.
103. See generally REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE VOTING SYSTEM,
1998, Cm. 4090 (detailing both parties' submissions).
104. See id.
105. See generally Cyril Adjei, Human Rights Theory and the Bill of Rights Debate, 58 MOD. L.
REV. 17 (1995).
106. See Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep 14, 17-18
(1985).
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to develop some obscure and erratic legal principle of privacy, 107
with all the politicization that might follow. Specific legislative re-
forms have certainly occurred over the past twenty-five years,08 but
the reliance upon political activism in favor of rights has also had
its limitations. The results are piecemeal, and the strategy assumes
that politicians are willing to give high priority to rights issues in
the legislative calendar. This cannot have the cultural and educa-
tional impact that a comprehensive bill of rights could engender.09
In any event, it is not inconsistent with the enactment of a bill of
rights to have specific legislative reforms.
Outside of parliamentary reform, there has been growing inter-
est in defining and strengthening concepts of citizenship. In part,
this trend is encouraged by external factors, such as the perceived
encroachment of the European Union, which is depicted as dilut-
ing and confusing what it means to be "British."" More positively,
the trend builds upon the belief that protection and respect for
rights are dependent not so much upon a formal documentary bill
of rights but upon the prevailing values of elites, particularly poli-
ticians and the civil service.' This suggests that education, the
enunciation of standards, and working protocols will all be very
important, and that, in addition to the 61ites, a culture of rights
should be encouraged reciprocally in citizens. The issue was exam-
ined in the Report of the (Speaker's) Commission in 1990.12 The
Report rejected a bill of rights in a normative sense, preferring in-
stead a codification of rights and duties in existing laws, but also
suggested that a standing Royal Commission on Citizenship exam-
ine proposed legislation and warn of incursions into rights. It also
made various suggestions as to the teaching of citizenship within
the school curriculum and changes to the honors system, some of
which have now been implemented.
3
107. See, e.g., Interception of Communications Act, 1985, c. 56 (Eng.); see also Robert H.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,9 (1971).
108. See, e.g., Data Protection Act, 1984-98, c. 29, c. 35 (Eng.); Local Government
(Access to Information) Act, 1985, c. 43 (Eng.).
109. See generally LABOUR PARTY, A NEW AGENDA FOR BRITAIN (1990); Robert Smith,
Where's the Beef?, 141 NEW L.J. 120 (1991).
110. See generally Neil MacCormick, Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-Sovereign State, 44
POL. STUD. 553 (1996).
111. See David C. Barnum et al., Constitutional and Cultural Underpinnings of Political Free-
dom in Britain and the United States, 12 OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 362, 376-77 (1992).
112. SeeJim L. Murdoch, Encouraging Citizenship: Report of the Commission on Citizenship,
54 MOD. L. REv. 439 (1991).
113. See 220 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1993) 455 (detailing changes to the grant of
honors); Department for Education and Employment website, at http://www.dfee.gov.uk/
news/99/208.htm (stating that the teaching of "citizenship" becomes part of the
"knowledge and understanding about becoming informed citizens" under the National
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A more lasting reform has been the Citizen's Charter, issued in
the nature of an administrative code rather than legislation.'1 4 The
Charter is concerned with the citizen not as a political actor but as
a passive consumer of state or semi-state services, and it generally
encourages standard-setting, performance review, and grievance
procedures. The Charter, which has been treated as a rolling pro-
gram for public services, conforms with British traditions in regard
to rights in two respects. First, it builds upon a British tradition of
pragmatism and distrust of principle; having a high percentage of
trains keeping good time is depicted as more important to the
British psyche than vague (and possibly dangerous) rights to free
speech. Second, although the Citizens' Charter was the most im-
portant public service reform of John Major's Premiership, it
complemented the themes of "new public management" associ-
ated in the United Kingdom with Prime Minister Thatcher and
in the United States with President Reagan." 5 Thus, where the
state cannot be rolled back (through privatization), it should be
run along lines more commonly associated with private enter-
prises in the expectation that the services delivered will be more
responsive to the citizen-consumer's demands. In this way, the
notion of citizenship is broadened from earlier political concep-
tions: the "rights" conferred are certainly not in the civil or
political spheres, nor are they normally enforceable through the
courts, but serve more as precepts for administrators. Given the
limitations in all of these reforms and approaches, it is not surpris-
ing that the pressures for a "full" bill of rights continued.
Curriculum) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); National Curricu-
lum website, at http://www.nc.uk.net (detailing the curriculum components for various age
groups) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
114. CABINET OFFICE, THE CITIZEN'S CHARTER, 1991, Cm. 1599; CABINET OFFICE,
CITIZEN'S CHARTER-FIVE YEARS ON, 1996, Cm. 3370; PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1996-
97) 78 (House of Commons Public Service Committee discussions on the Citizen's Char-
ter). See generally Anne Barron & Colin Scott, The Citizen's Charter Programme, 55 MOD. L. REV.
526 (1992).
115. See generally DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: How
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT Is TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992) (analyzing the
infusion of entrepreneurial models and ideas to improve government); ROD A.W. RHODES,
UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE: POLICY NETWORKS, GOVERNANCE, REFLEXIVITY AND Ac-
COUNTABILITY 53-56, 95-97 (1997) (exploring the contradictions of the new public
management and the contribution of the Citizen's Charter to a dramatic agenda for
change); MARTINJ. SMITH, THE CORE EXECUTIVE IN BRITAIN (1999); TRANSFORMING BRIT-
ISH GOVERNMENT (Rod A.W. Rhodes ed., 2000); SPENCER ZIFCAF, NEW MANAGERIALISM:
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN WHITEHALL AND CANBERRA (1994) (comparing British and
Australian management reform in order to identify the central factors that promote and
retard administrative innovation); John Stewart & Kieron Walsh, Change in the Management of
Public Services, 70 PUB. ADMIN. 499 (1992).
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C. Proximate Legal History
The enactment of the Human Rights Act during the time of a
strong Labour Government is, at first glance, a surprising devel-
opment. The idea of having a codified, statutory bill of rights is not
traditional Labour Party policy."6 Indeed, the left wing of the La-
bour Party has tended to oppose such suggestions, while the right
and center saw it as irrelevant or, at best, low priority.117 Among the
reasons were that Western-style rights emphasize civil and political
advancement rather than social and economic progress. Addition-
ally, there is suspicion that members of the judiciary, who are seen
as being closet or even open Tories, will wreck the social and eco-
nomic plans of the Labour Party. Yet, it would be wrong to see
even the traditional Labour movement as wholly opposed to a Bill
of Rights. It was, after all, the government of Attlee, the greatest
socialist government in British history, which signed the European
Convention in 1950. In reality the Labour Party was always fairly
lukewarm towards the Convention and made serious efforts to
keep it off center stage. What changed?
The change was cultivated during the short leadership reign of
John Smith. After the loss of the 1992 election, there was some
feeling of despair that the Tories could never be beaten and that a
new style Labour Party would have to emerge, one that would be
forced to enter alliances to achieve power. Modernization, there-
fore, became a buzzword, which evolved into a policy of broad
discussions with the Liberal Party to find common ground. The
Liberals have long been the main champions of constitutional re-
form, and a bill of rights has long figured at the top of their
political agenda." 8 By late 1993, the Labour Party agenda included
a policy to monitor and promote human rights."9 This informal
consensus continued as a distinguishing feature of the new-style
"New Labour" politics after the 1997 election, even though Labour
did not depend on Liberal votes to continue in office.
116. See Keith D. Ewing & Conor A. Gearty, Rocky Foundations for Labour's New Rights,
1997 EUR. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 146, 147.
117. See id. at146.
118. Amongst the leading Liberal proponents have been John MacDonald and Lord
Lester. SeeJOHN MACDONALD, BILL OF RIGHTS (1969); Lord Lester, Democracy and Individual
Rights, FABIAN TRACT No. 390 (1969). A Liberal peer, Lord Wade, was prominent in spon-
soring draft bills of rights for discussion. See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE
HOUSE OF LORDS ON A BILL OF RIGHTS, 582 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1977) 176.
119. See WADHAM & MOUNTFIELD, supra note 10, at 7-8.
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The acceptance of a bill of rights was marked by a Labour Party
paper issued in 1996, Bringing Rights Home,120 which suggested the
incorporation of the European Convention into domestic law.
Many of the details were left suspiciously vague. 121 It was clear that
even the future Lord Chancellor, Derry Irvine, did not favor the
full-blooded American-style version in which judges could set aside
legislation, as he warned against 'judicial supremacism. " 2 Never-
theless, the idea was firmly adopted by the future Home Secretary,
Jack Straw, l2 so that when Labour took office, there was strong
commitment by the key officers of state to new legislation on
rights.
The details of the bill for the incorporation of the European
Convention soon emerged after the 1997 General Election with
the publication of the Home Department's Paper, Rights Brought
Home: The Human Rights Bill. 124 Several features emerged as signifi-
cant. First, the emphasis was indeed on modernization: to avoid
the cost and delay of taking cases to Strasbourg 125 and to increase
accessibility of remedies.2 6 Additionally, the Bill sought to enhance
awareness of rights and to instill a rights culture. Next, the Paper
envisaged the incorporation of the European Convention, not a
wholly new, Anglocentric Bill of Rights. 1 7 Finally, there would be
judicial enforcement, but the judges would not be able to invali-
date primary laws.12 8 As the Paper explains: "This conclusion
arises from the importance which the Government attaches to
Parliamentary sovereignty. In this context, Parliamentary sover-
eignty means that Parliament is competent to make any law on any
matter of its choosing and no court may question the validity of
any Act that it passes.'
'1 29
120. Jack Straw & Paul Boateng, Bringing Rights Home: Labour's Plans to Incorporate the
European Convention on Human Rights into U.K. Law, 1997 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 71.
121. SeeJohn Wadham, Bringing Rights Halfvay Home, 1997 EUR. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 115,
141.
122. Lord Derry Irvine, Judges and Decision-Makers: The Them), and Practice of Wednesbury
Review, 1996 PUB. L. 59, 77; see also LORD MCCLUSKEY, LAW, JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY
(1987); SirJohn Laws, Law and Democracy, 1995 PUB. L. 72, 77-78.
123. SeeStraw & Boateng, supra note 120, at 71.
124. RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME: THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILL, 1997, Cm. 3782 (hereinafter
RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME).
125. Id. 11.18. These problems are exacerbated in applications by, or on behalf of,
children. See generally Jane Fortin, Rights Brought Home for Children, 62 MOD. L. REV. 350
(1999).
126. RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME, supra note 124, 1 1.19.
127. Id. 72.1.
128. Id. 772.6-13.
129. Id. 72.13.
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As already noted, traditional British constitutional theory
stresses the concept of Crown prerogative and parliamentary sov-
ereignty rather than popular sovereignty or rights. Much of the
enforcement and observance is therefore to remain at a political
level.
Against the background of these observations, Part II surveys the
Act itself, starting with the rights to be protected, then continues
with the beneficiaries of rights as well as those upon whom duties
are imposed, and finally considers procedural matters and the role
of the judiciary.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
A. The Catalogue of Rights
The central feature of the Human Rights Act is the
incorporation of the European Convention into United Kingdom
law. Although this is "a strong form of incorporation," it falls short
of direct incorporation.1 30 As far as English law is concerned, in the
words of section 3(1), "[s]o far as it is possible to do so, primary
legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given
effect in a way which [sic] is compatible with the Convention
rights." 3 1 In this way, the Convention is not dispositive-it is a
shaper not a mover-although the Human Rights Act can be the
basis for legal action.12 Another way in which the Act indirectly
incorporates the European Convention is that the English Courts
are not bound by the decisions of the Commission or even the
European Court of Human Rights. 3  Consequently, it will be an
English interpretation of the Convention that prevails and not
simply the Strasbourg interpretation. The political motivation
behind this divergence is to allow the English courts to influence
Strasbourg reciprocally. 3 4  This imperative follows some
130. 582 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 1230.
131. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 3(1) (Eng.).
132. See id. § 7(1). By section 7(1) (a), "[a] person who claims that a public authority has
acted (or proposes to act) in a way which [sic] is made unlawful by section 6(1) may ...
bring proceedings against the authority under this Act in the appropriate court or tribunal
.... "Id.
133. Id. § 2(1). By section 2(1): "A court or tribunal determining a question which [sic]
has arisen in connection with a Convention right must take into account" the Convention
principles and rules. Id.
134. RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME, supra note 124, 1.18.
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considerable dissatisfaction with the quality of the European
judgments, for example, as expressed by Lord Mackay in 1996.135 It
may equally provide some encouragement for English courts to be
stricter and more interventionist. Stricdy speaking, there can be no
domestic version of the doctrine of margin of appreciation,
36
though ideas such as respect for democratic decisions may have a
similar effect depending on the rights affected and whether the
courts can claim expertise.
In addition to the limitations on the modes of relation to the
Convention, not all of the Convention is incorporated. The levels
of decision making are covered comprehensively. Thus, the Act
requires in section 2 that:
(1) [a] court or tribunal determining a question which
[sic] has arisen in connection with a Convention
right must take into account any-
(a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory
opinion of the European Court of Human
Rights,
(b) opinion of the Commission given in a report
adopted under Article 31 of the Convention,
(c) decision of the Commission in connection
with Article 26 or 27(2) of the Convention, or
(d) decision of the Committee of Ministers taken
under Article 46 of the Convention, whenever
made or given, so far as, in the opinion of the
court or tribunal, it is relevant to the proceed-
ings in which that question has arisen. 
37
The Human Rights Act, however, does not simply refer to the
whole body of Convention norms. Instead, Articles 2 to 12 and 14,
Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol, and Articles 1 and 2 of the
Sixth Protocol are specifically scheduled. 18 It is understandable
that Article 1 of the Convention is left to one side, as it is a state-
ment that makes sense only in international law. 39 Article 13,
135. SeeGibb, supra note 95, at 10.
136. See Regina v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions ex parte Kebilene, I Crim. App. R. 275,
325 (Q.B. 2000) (rejecting complaint that there had been a breach of the presumption of
innocence); Regina v. Stratford Justices expartelmbert, 2 Crim. App. R. 276 (Q.B. 1999). See
generally Rabinder Singh et al., Is There a Role for the "Margin of Appreciation" in National Law
After the Human Rights Act?, 1999 EUR. Hum. RTS. L. REv. 15.
137. Human Rights Act § 2.
138. Id.
139. European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 1. By Article 1: "[t]he High Contracting
Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in
section 1 of this Convention." Id.
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however, is also not included, and this omission may be more sig-
nificant. Article 13 states that "[e]veryone whose rights and
freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an
effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official
capacity."
140
The exclusion of this provision from the Human Rights Act sug-
gests that the Act is not intended to be used by judges as the basis
for major or radical legal surgery; judges are to be confined to
specified remedies and should not engage in the invention of
wholly new causes of action or legal doctrines.14 ' In particular, this
omission gives rise to the inference that its purpose is to avoid forc-
ing English judges to develop a new right of privacy at common
law. The Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine, confirmed the govern-
ment's view that the Act is not necessarily the harbinger of new
privacy protections. Nevertheless, the Act possibly requires com-
patibility with rights to privacy under Article 8 in two ways.143 One is
that the Act itself can be invoked as the basis for an action to pro-
tect privacy.'"4 Second, is the notion that privacy must be
considered relevant and influential in all litigation; there is noth-
ing to forbid judges from developing the concept within common
law even if they are under no specific duty to do so.
Some rights outside the original 1950 text of the Convention are
also included within schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act. These
include Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol and Articles 1 and 2 of
the Sixth Protocol.' 45 Although the First Protocol was signed in
1952 and commitment to it has been long-standing, the enactment
process of the Human Rights Act led to a review of the state of rati-
fications. In particular, pressure arose for the ratification of the
Sixth Protocol and thereby the effective abolition of the death
penalty (except in war-time). 4 Members of Parliament have also
140. Id. at art. 13.
141. See 583 PARu. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 475.
142. Id. at 785.
143. See Rabinder Singh, Privacy and the Media After the Human Rights Act, 1998 EUR.
Hum. RTS. L. REv. 712, 712.
144. Human Rights Act § 7. By section 7(1)(a), "[a] person who claims that a public
authority has acted (or proposes to act) in a way which is made unlawful by section 6(1) may
... bring proceedings against the authority under this Act in the appropriate court or tri-
bunal ... ." Id.
145. Id. at sched. 1. The fights in the First Protocol relate to the protection of property,
the right to education, and the right to free elections (Articles 1 through 3 respectively).
First Protocol, supra note 50. The rights in the Sixth Protocol relate to the abolition of the
death penalty, except in time of war (Articles 1 and 2 respectively). Sixth Protocol, supra
note 52.
146. SeeCrime and Disorder Act, 1998, c. 37 (Eng.).
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expressed a commitment to ratify the Seventh Protocol 47 once
amending legislation has been passed to provide for equality be-
tween spouses in all respects. 4 The ratification of the Fourth
Protocol, which deals with freedom of movement,149 is much more
problematic; given the colonial history of the United Kingdom,
various types of citizenship exist and not all carry full rights of en-
try.150
In addition to any new rights imported by the Act, section 11
makes clear that existing rights (such as those under common law)
are preserved. The Act should not be assumed to be a comprehen-
sive catalogue of rights:
A person's reliance on a Convention right does not restrict-
(a) any other right or freedom conferred on him by or un-
der any law having effect in any part of the United
Kingdom; or
(b) his right to make any claim or bring any proceedings
which [sic] he could make or bring apart from sections 7
to 9.151
The common law is not obviously more expansive in terms of
the rights granted, but it may be more generous in some respects
in terms of level of damages, including the award of aggravated
damages.
Conversely, Article 15152 is mentioned in schedule 1 of the Hu-
man Rights Act. This provision allows a state to "derogate" from its
obligations to respect rights in response to a national emergency:
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life
of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures
derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, pro-
vided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other
obligations under international law.1
5
3
147. Seventh Protocol, supra note 53 (relating to the expulsion of aliens, equality be-
tween spouses, and compensation for miscarriages ofjustice).
148. 597 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1999) 201; RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME, supra note
124, 4.15.
149. Fourth Protocol, supra note 51 (securing certain rights and freedoms other than
those included in the Convention and in the First Protocol).
150. See British Nationality Act, 1981, c. 61 (Eng.).
151. Human RightsAct § 11.
152. European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 15.
153. Human Rights Act, sched. 3.
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The derogation power is currently in use in Northern Ireland to
allow the police to detain terrorist suspects for seven days without
any judicial authorisation or review. The practice, which contra-
venes Article 5(3) of the Convention, 154 is currently authorized by
section 14 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions)
Act of 1989,155 and became the subject of the derogation in 1988
following the adverse decision in Brogan v. United Kingdom.156 This
derogation, which was upheld as valid by the European Court in
1993, 157 may continue, as the existing one is recognized specifically
under section 14 and schedule 2 of the Human Rights Act for a
further five years. There are plans, however, to end reliance upon
this particular notice of derogation, which will be withdrawn when
the Terrorism Act 2000158 comes into force, since schedule 8 will
require judicial authorisation for detention beyond four days. Any
future derogations are likewise to last for five years. 159 These excep-
tional restraints on rights are handled poorly by the Human Rights
Act. There is no recognition of the need to keep derogations con-
tinually under review; the "peace process" in Northern Ireland has
resulted in a substantial reduction in actual violence, and chal-
lenges to the continuance of the derogation in those changed
circumstances are pending already before the European Court in
the case of Marshall v. United Kingdom.'6° But no form of judicial or
legislative review of the necessity for a derogation is provided for
in the Human Rights Act. Any renewal of a derogation must be by
statutory order, which must be approved in Parliament. This is not
a requirement in respect of the Brogan derogation, however."'
Section 15 and schedule 3 of the Act also preserve the reserva-
tion to Article 2 of Protocol 2 (entered into in 1952), which
requires education in accordance with parental wishes: "[T]he
154. See Brogan v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 11209/84, 11234/84, 11266/84,
11386/85, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117, 136 (1989).
155. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1989, c. 4 (Eng.) (temporary provisions); see also CLIVE
WALKER, THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN BRITISH LAw 31-46 (1992) (explaining the
history of the provision, beginning in 1974).
156. 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117 (1989).
157. Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 14553-14554/89, 17 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 539, 578 (1994); see also Susan Marks, Terrorism and Derogation Under the European
Convention on Human Rights, 52 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 360, 361 (1993). The notice still was as-
sumed to be valid in May 1996 by Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Resolution,
Res DH (94)31, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
158. Terrorism Act 2000, at c. 11.
159. Human Rights Act § 16.
160. App. No. 41571/98, available at http://www.ehcr.coe.int/eng (pending as of Dec.
2000).
161. Human Rights Act § 16(3).
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principle affirmed in the second sentence of Article 2 is accepted
by the United Kingdom only so far as it is compatible with the pro-
vision of efficient instruction and training, and the avoidance of
unreasonable public expenditure.", 62 This reservation also is sus-
tained for a further five years'6 3 and arguably is subject to even less
scrutiny than the derogation measures in that the Minister must
review it and report to Parliament, but any renewal order need not
be approved by Parliament nor even laid before it. 164
B. The Desirability of the Convention as
a Domestic Catalogue of Rights
The use of the European Convention as the basis for a domestic
code of rights, by far the most frequently advocated option, 1 5 en-
tails both advantages and disadvantages.
The wholesale adoption of the Convention cuts short the
potentially interminable debates as to which rights to include and
how to define them. As John Waldron points out, the passage of a
bill of rights will not settle inherently such arguments; it needs to
be based on generally agreed upon norms and cannot specifically
define them. 6 The Convention is both an authoritative and well
established text that already commands wide respect both
nationally and internationally. Furthermore, it has an established
case law, so it is not a wholly unknown quantity that allows judges
to start with a blank piece of paper. As well as its normative
attractions, the Convention is also politically inviting, because it
avoids a drafting and debating process that would otherwise
involve a major commitment in terms of parliamentary time and
governmental effort. The task is by no means impossible for British
civil servants; as already mentioned, these officials were
162. Id. at sched. 3.
163. Id. § 17.
164. See generally J.D. Hayhurst & Peter Wallington, The Parliamentary Scrutiny of Delegated
Legislation, 1988 PUB. L. 547.
165. See HOUSE OF LORDS, REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS
ON A BILL OF RIGHTS, 1977-78, at 176; S.A.C.H.R., THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY
LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1977, Cmnd. 7009; Thomas H. Bingham, The European Conven-
tion on Human Rights: Time to Incorporat 109 L.Q. REv. 390, 390 (1993); Lord Nicholas
Browne-Wilkinson, The Infiltration of a Bill of Rights, 1992 PUB. L. 397, 398; Sir John Laws,
Law and Democracy, 1995 PUB. L. 72, 81; Sir Stephen Sedley, Human Rights: A Twenty-First
Century Agenda, 1995 PUB. L. 386, 386; Lord Harry Woolf, Droit Public-English Style, 1995
PUB. L. 57, 58.
166. Jeremy E. Waldron, A Rights Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 18, 18-19 (1993).
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instrumental in the drafting of the Convention itself.167 In addition,
they have produced many statements of rights for the many
Commonwealth countries that have gained independence from
colonial rule since 1945.16 Many of these constitutional bills of
rights are based on the European Convention.1 69
By comparison, one might consider the U.S. Bill of Rights and
the more recent experience of Canada when it decided to
"patriate" its constitution. The Canadian Act of 1982 was passed
only after many years of negotiations between Federal and Provin-
cial governments."' Even now, objections from Quebec have
persisted 171 and have resulted in somewhat unprincipled compro-
mises.1 72 Much of this kind of interminable wrangling can'be
avoided by adopting a tried and tested set of rights, which, because
it comes as an enduring international package, also rules out any
prospect of lobbying for amendments at a purely national level. In
this way, reliance upon an international document provides a de-
gree of entrenchment that is not available in legal terms. 173 Some
view the entrenchment thus engendered as problematic on the
basis that the Convention is said to be tired and old and therefore
in need of updating. But this criticism strikingly misreads the tran-
scendental nature of a bill of rights-it is precisely to avoid the
fashions of the day and to provide through open-textured lan-
guage a normative guide that can evolve with society. The fact that
the two-century-year-old U.S. Bill of Rights has been applied to
such modern day issues as the freedom of the internet17 4 amply il-
lustrates this point.
167. See Geoffrey Marston, The United Kingdom's Part in the Preparation of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 796, 796 (1993).
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Nigeria Independence Act, 1960, 8 Eliz. 2, c. 55 (Eng.); Zambia Inde-
pendence Act, 1964, c. 65 (Eng.); see also STANLEY A. DE SMITH, THE COMMONWEALTH AND
ITS CONSTITUTIONS 162-215 (1964); M. Sornarajah, Bills of Rights: The Commonwealth Debate,
9 COMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 161, 161-64 (1976). But there have recently been more esoteric
examples, including the Falkland Islands Constitution Order, (1985) SI 1985/444 and
CHINA, BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 14-18 (1990).
170. See HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, FIRST REPORT: THE BRIT-
ISH NORTH AMERICA ACTS: THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT, 1980-81, Cmnd. 8450, 295.
171. See Att'y Gen. of Quebec and Att'y Gen. of Canada, [1983] D.L.R. 385; see also
Manuel v. Att'y Gen., 3 All E.R. 822, 823 (Q.B. 1982).
172. See Act Respecting the Constitution Act, 1982, S.Q., c. 21 (Can.) (relating to the
Constitution Act of 1982 and reading all laws before 1982 to include an express override
provision). The provision was upheld in Ford v. Att'y Gen. of Quebec, [1989] D.L.R. 577,
578-79.
173. See infra pp. 36-39.
174. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 862-64 (1997) (discussing challenges to the
Communications Decency Act of 1996); Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083,
1090-97 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing challenges to the Child Pornography Prevention Act of
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The adoption of the European Convention could also avoid con-
flicts between domestic and international rights and should reduce
costly and delayed litigation under international procedures. 7 5 The
Act, however, may not fully achieve these goals. 6 The relationship
between domestic and international rights is meant to be reflexive;
that is, domestic and international rights influence each other. Part
of the conception of the Human Rights Act is that English judges are
not bound by European jurisprudence; they may depart from it in
the hope that their innovations eventually will produce shifts in
thinking in Strasbourg.17 Divergences can arise deliberately, as well
as from lack of understanding or knowledge or from a difference in
timing, such as when an issue comes first before English courts and
only later is the subject of a decision in Strasbourg. One solution to
these difficulties might be to provide for advisory opinions from the
European Court of Human Rights, in the same way referrals can be
made to the European Court of Justice under section 3 of the Euro-
pean Communities Act of 1972. 17 This facility could not be achieved
unilaterally under the Human Rights Act, however, because such
referrals currently are forbidden by the Convention rule that re-
quires the exhaustion of domestic remedies. 179 It seems unlikely that
the Council of Europe would agree to a change just to suit the
United Kingdom. While the procedures of the Court recently have
• 180
been changed by Protocol 11 of the Convention, the primary goal
1996); ACLU v. Reno I, 31 F.2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (discussing challenges to the Child
Online Protection Act of 1998).
175. Seesuprap. 17.
176. See supra p. 23.
177. See Rolv Ryssdall, Opinion: The Coming Age of the European Convention on Human
Rights, 1996 EUR. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 18, 26; Lord Leonard Hoffman, Human Rights and the
House of Lords, 62 MOD. L. REV. 159, 162, 166 (1999).
178. European Communities Act, 1972, c. 68, § 3 (Eng.). Section 3 enforces article 177 of
the Treaty of Rome, stating "[f] or the purposes of all legal proceedings any question as to
the meaning or effect of any of the Treaties, or as to the validity, meaning or effect of any
Community instrument, shall be treated as a question of law (and, if not referred to the
European court, be for determination as such in accordance with the principles laid down
by and any relevant decision of the European Court)." Id.; see Regina v. Plymouth Justices ex
parteRogers, 2 All E.R. 175 (Q.B. 1982); C.I.L.F.I.T. v. Minister of Health, [1Y83] 1 C.M.L.R.
472 (1983).
179. Eleventh Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 11, 1994, Europ. T.S. No. 155 [hereinafter Elev-
enth Protocol]. By Article 35 of the Convention, "[t] he Court may only deal with the matter
after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised
rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the
final decision was taken." European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 35; see A.A. CANCADO
TRINDADE, THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 60 (1983).
180. Eleventh Protocol, supra note 179. See generally Luke Clements, Striking the Right
Balance: The New Rules of Procedure for the European Court of Human Rights, 1999 EUR. HUM.
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of this simplification of procedures is to allow the Court to better
cope with the growing flood of applications from western Euro-
pean countries and the new stream of cases from eastern European
members. 181
Nevertheless, there are alleged disadvantages in simply adopting
the Convention. First, it could be argued that the vague and
loosely drafted provisions of the Convention are alien to British
law and will cause problems for English judges trained in the more
precise and pragmatic traditions of common law. This argument is
not very convincing, however. The European Court of Human
Rights always has included a British judge whose judgments are not
noted for being wayward. In addition, a rights discourse has to
some extent infiltrated English law, 18 2 and English judges increas-
ingly have become inured to handling the issues of broad
principle. It is, of course, inevitable that constitutional rights are
drafted in vague language relative to road traffic regulations or the
common law intricacies of offer and acceptance in contract. A bill
of rights must be drafted so as to provide flexibility for changes in
attitudes over time and in different circumstances. There is no evi-
dence that English judges cannot learn to appreciate this mode of
reasoning.
Next, the European Convention is said to be inappropriate as a
domestic bill of rights since it was not drafted solely with the
United Kingdom in mind. As a result, there may be significant
omissions that fail to take account of the quirks of English legal
life,'8 especially in regard to its adversarial criminal process that
differs from the inquisitorial models in most of Europe. 4 For ex-
ample, there is no express privilege against self incrimination. It
may be argued, however, that these issues can be addressed
through the adaptation of the broad statements of principle in the
Convention. The European Court itself has managed to take due
account of adversarial process and the role of the "right to silence"
RTS. L. REV. 266; Lord Anthony Lester, The European Convention in the New Architecture of
Europe, 1996 PUB. L. 5.
181. For a list of ratifications, see Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights
Judgments and Decisions, http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/Judgments.htm (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
182. Seesources cited supra notes 19, 37-41.
183. For a full list of alleged omissions, see John Wadham, Why Incorporation of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights is Not Enough, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
25 (Richard Gordon & Richard Wilnot-Smith eds., 1996).
184. See generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 55, 59 (Phil
Fennell et al. eds., 1994); CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY i-
ii, 73-104 (Christine Van Den Wyngaert ed., 1993).
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within it in cases such as Saunders v. United Kingdom '85 and Murray v.
United Kingdom.186 Indeed, in both cases, it afforded more protec-
tion for the detainee than thought proper by the United Kingdom
Parliament.17 In the same way, it is hard to see why the English ju-
diciary should not follow suit and make sensible provisions for
rights in an adversarial system. 8
A related argument is that the European Convention, as a broad
statement of international law, cannot readily take account of sub-
tle regional concerns of Scotland and Northern Ireland. A
response to this claim is that the broad statements of principle in
the Convention are inherently adaptable, and judges assigned to
those jurisdictions are well-placed to make the necessary adapta-
tions. One would expect the main differences to be procedural
rather than substantive, but it should be noted that one of the tasks
of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, established
under the Northern Ireland Act of 199889 and the Belfast ("Good
Friday") Agreement, ' 90 is to consider whether Northern Ireland
would benefit from a distinctive bill of rights supplementary to the
European Convention measures.191 In Scotland, the Human Rights
Act of 1998 entered into force by virtue of the operation of the
Scotland Act of 1998,192 and the Scottish judiciary has already
found several breaches.
9 3
Perhaps the most serious objection to the adoption of the Con-
vention is that its use in this way fundamentally misreads its
185. App. No. 19187/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313 (1997) (holding use in criminal pro-
ceedings of statement obtained under threat of criminal penalty a violation of Article 6(1)).
186. App. No. 18731/91, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29 (1996) (finding that the use of silence as
adverse evidence in circumstances where access to a lawyer had been denied was not a viola-
tion of Article 6(1)).
187. See Saunders, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 313; Murray, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 29. Both cases
arose from United Kingdom legislation.
188. See Sybil Sharpe, The European Convention: A Suspect's Charter?, 1997 CRIM. L. REv.
848.
189. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, § 68 (Eng.). See also Northern Human Rights
Commission website, http://www.nihrc.org/index.htm (explaining what the Northern
Ireland Human Rights Commission does and providing recent information).
190. See Belfast Agreement, 1998, Cm. 3883, at 16-18. See generally Geoff Gilbert, The
Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, Minority Rights and Self-Determination, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
943 (1998); Brigid Hadfield, The Belfast Agreement, Sovereignty and the State of the Union, 1998
PUB. L. 599; Donal O'Donnell, Constitutional Background to and Aspects of the Good Friday
Agreement-A Republic of Ireland Perspective, 50 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 76 (1999).
191. See DRAFr STRATEGIC PLAN 2000-2001 15 (2001), available at http://
www.nihrc.org/index.htm (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform). The
plan focuses on the principles of mutual respect for the identity and ethos of both commu-
nities and parity of esteem.
192. Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46, §§ 29(2) (d), 57(2) (Eng.).
193. See, e.g., Starrs v. Procurator Fiscal, 2000 S.L.T. 42 (challenging impartiality of a
temporary sheriff on grounds of lack of security of tenure).
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purpose. The Convention was drafted to secure a minimum level
of rights protection; it demands merely the lowest common de-
nominator in western European liberal democracies. Therefore,
the signatories produced a relatively weak statement about rights
in order to secure the agreement of widely divergent states to this
new concept of common rights, while at the same time overcoming
doubts about potential loss of national sovereignty. These limita-
tions in the Convention are illustrated below.
One limitation is that there are numerous restrictions on the
substantive rights built into the drafting of the Convention. For
194example, Article 10, which guarantees freedom of expression,
amounts to a compromise far removed from the absolutist state-
ment in the first provision of the U.S. Bill of Rights. 95 Some of
these restrictions have come to be seen as too severe, such as the
pre-licensing of broadcasting within Article 10, which acts as a
form of enforcement of the state monopolization of broadcast-
ing.196 The idea that any restriction of rights has to be justified by
reference to other rights rather than social interests, though, is not
the European way. Nevertheless, the inculcation of a purposive
approach to interpretation of the Convention should be able to
overcome these concerns, at least if the judges turn their backs on
the doctrine of "margin of appreciation, '"' 97 which applies to inter-
national relations only and assumes that Strasbourg judges have
insufficient knowledge and understanding. 9
Second, the Convention largely ignores social and economic
rights. Although they are stated in the European Social Charter of
1961, that code does not carry the same prominence or enforce-
ment mechanisms as the Convention's civil and political
protections.' 99 It has been left to the European Union to address
194. European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 10.
195. U.S. Const. amend. I. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
196. See Informationsverein Lentia v. Austria, App. Nos. 13914/88, 15041/89,
15717/89, 15779/89, 17207/90, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 93, 99-107 (1994).
197. Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, 745
(1976) (challenge to English obscenity laws); see also Scherer v. Switzerland, App. No.
17116/90, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 276, 285 (1994) (challenges to the application of Switzerland's
obscenity laws); Miller v. Switzerland, App. No. 10737/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 212, 232
(1991).
198. See supra note 136; see also Regina v. Stratford Justices ex parte Imbert, 2 Crim. App.
R. 276, 286--87 (Q.B. 1999); WADHAM & MOUNTFIELD, supra note 10, at 18; Convention Does
Not Demand Disclosure, TIMES (London), Feb. 25, 1999.
199. European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, Europ. T.S. No. 35. Enforcement of the
Charter is by way of reports from member states. The reports are commented on by a com-
mittee of experts, the Governmental Committee of the Social Charter (with one
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these issues at a legal level. Accordingly, the rights in European law
have concentrated upon employment related rights, though the
Social Charter of the Maastricht Agreement provides for a much
wider agenda, including not only workers but also pensioners, stu-
•• 200
dents, and others. Some commentators have argued for a further
Convention protocol that would link with the Social Charter, or
some other, perhaps broader statement about minimal levels of
welfare, were such rights to be justiciable.2 0 ' The collective nature
of such protocols makes them generally less suitable as subjects for
juridification, however.
A third problem has been the derogations under Article 15,
which have been the common resort of the United Kingdom with
regard to Northern Ireland. °2 This exception clause again reflects
respect for national sovereignty by the international community.
Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights has been very def-
erential to claims of emergency, especially in relation to
• 203
terrorism. There is concern, though, in the United Kingdom that
the Human Rights Act simply perpetuates this position, and, at a
domestic legal level where national sovereignty is not being chal-
lenged, should have imposed more checks on the exercise of the
Crown's role as protector of its citizens. Whether this would be ac-
complished through a form of judicial review or through
legislative mechanisms is a matter for debate. °4
representative for each state) and the Council of Europe's Assembly and Committee of
Ministers. The European Court of Human Rights has no jurisdiction and individuals have
no rights to make complaints. DAVID HARRIS, THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 192-99,
235-45 (1984).
200. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 12, as implemented
in the United Kingdom by the European Communities (Amendment) Act of 1993, and
amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, Cm.3780, as implemented in the United King-
dom by the European Communities (Amendment) Act, 1998, c. 21 (Eng.).
201. Compare Keith D. Ewing, Social Rights and Constitutional Law, 1999 PuB. L. 104, 104
(pursuing the thesis that "there is a strong and compelling democratic case in favour of the
sovereignty of Parliament and against the entrenchment of rights, at least so far as this gives
to the courts the power to override legislation") with Constitution of Ireland 1937, art. 45, at
542 (stating that, "[t]he principles of social policy set forth in this Article are intended for
the general guidance of the Oierachtas. The application of those principles in the making
of laws shall be the care of the Oireachtas exclusively, and shall not be cognisable by any
court under any provisions of this Constitution."). See also Murtagh Properties, Ltd. v.
Cleary, [1972] I.R. 330, 335-36 (Ire.).
202. European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 15; seeJARME ORAA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 144-51, 179-82 (1992); Timothy H. Jones,
The Devaluation of Rights Under the European Convention, 1995 PuB. L. 430, 433-35; Clive
Walker, Constitutional Governance and Special Powers Against Terrorism, 35 COLUM. J. TRAN-
SNAT'L L. 1, 48 (1997).
203. See Walker, supra note 202, at 1.
204. See William J. Brennan, The American Experience: Free Speech and National Security, in
FREE SPEECH AND NATIONAL SECURITY 10 (Shimon Shetreet ed., 1991); see also George J.
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C. Entrenchment of Rights
An issue that sparked much debate about a bill of rights during
the two and a half decades before the enactment of the Human
Rights Act was whether rights could be entrenched against later
repeal or amendment by Parliament. This issue took center stage
in the debates of the House of Lords' Select Committee Report of
1978. °5 The short answer is that direct entrenchment as in the
United States was never possible, given how broadly parliamentary
sovereignty is construed in English law.' ° It would be feasible to
achieve a lesser degree of legal entrenchment by including an in-
terpretation clause to the effect that later Acts do not impinge
upon rights, unless they state so expressly. This device would fol-
low the model of section 2 of the European Communities Act of
1972 , effective at least to prevent implied repeal by a later Act. In
addition, such a clause could eventually lead to a reassessment of
the nature of sovereignty itself. 
2
Since there is no direct incorporation under the Human Rights
Act, Convention jurisprudence need not always prevail-
Convention rights do not become part of English law of equal
standing to prior legislation. In this way, the Act does not even im-
ply the repeal of past legislation, and the Convention can only be
used as a vehicle for interpretation. In this respect, the Human
Alexander, The Illusory Protection of Human Rights by National Courts During Periods of Emer-
gency, 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1 (1984) (examining the martial rule in selected cases from common
law countries).
205. HOUSE OF LORDS, REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMIrTEE OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON
A BILL OF RIGHTS, 1977-78, at 176 (the only official inquiry in Britain prior to the Home
Department's Paper). But see STANDING ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN
NORTHERN IRELAND, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND,
1977, Cmnd. 7009.
206. See Anthony W. BRADLEY & KEITH D. EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW 86--98, 131-59 (12th ed. 1997); STANLEY A. DE SMITH & RODNEY BRAZIER,
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 459-64 (7th ed. 1994).
207. European Communities Act, 1972, c. 68, § 2 (Eng.). This strategy was used in the
many non-governmental attempts to sponsor a bill of rights before 1998. See Lord Anthony
Lester, The Mouse That Roared: The Human Rights Bill 1995,1995 PUB. L. 198,199.
208. See Trevor R.S. Allen, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Law, Politics, and Revolution, 113
L.Q. REV. 335, 443 (1997). See generally Paul P. Craig, Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment After Factortame, 11 Y.B. EUR. L. 221 (1991); John Eekelaar, The Death of Parliamentary
Sovereignty, 113 L.Q. REV. 185 (1997); Colin M.G. Himsworth, In a State No Longer: TheEnd of
Constitutionalism?, 1996 PUB. L. 639; Neil MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MOn. L.
REV. 1 (1993); Neil MacCormick, Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-Sovereign State, 44 POL.
STUD. 553 (1996); H.W.R. Wade, Sovereignty-Revolution or Evolution?, 112 L.Q. REV. 568
(1996).
209. 583 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 522, 522; Nicholas Bamforth, Parliamentary
Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act, 1998 PUB. L. 572, 572-73; Anthony T.H. Smith, The
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Rights Act has lower status than all other legislation. Despite this
limited impact, an emphasis on legal entrenchment in large part
would miss the point. It is far more important to secure political
entrenchment to ensure that the prevailing political atmosphere is
one that will give rise to the treatment of rights as sacrosanct and
to make it politically difficult to curtail them. So what is important
is to ensure full debate, time for reflection, and information. En-
trenchment relies ultimately on a frame of mind, not a legal
technicality.
In this respect, the Human Rights Act wisely adopts a subtle ap-
proach. It requires that the courts interpret legislation "[s] o far as
it is possible to do so ... in a way which [sic] is compatible with the
Convention rights" ° and makes it "unlawful for a public authority
to act in a way that is incompatible with a Convention right.2 1 1 In
addition to these duties, the underlying principle that the cata-
logue of rights are taken from international law and cannot easily
be disregarded without international disapprobation creates such a
frame of mind.
More disappointing is the absence of any firm commitment to
change parliamentary process. The Home Department's Paper
advanced the idea of a Parliamentary Select Committee.2 This
proposal also was raised during the parliamentary debate of the
Bill 12 and resulted in the intention to establish a joint parliamen-
tary committee on human rights. 4 There is no mention of it,
though, in the 1998 Act,2 1 5 nor is there currently any clear com-
mitment as to its details. Moreover, there has been no discussion
about other procedural safeguards, such as the possibility of
gathering expert evidence and delays in the parliamentary proc-
essing of a bill, so that reflection can be focused on the potential
damage to human rights. The need for such mechanisms is illus-
trated by the passage of the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and
Conspiracy) Act of 1998.216 The Act was devised in response to
the bombing on August 15, 1998, in the town of Omagh by the
Real Irish Republican Army, a Republican splinter-group, which
Human Rights Act and the Criminal Lawyer: The Constitutional Context, 1999 CRIM. L. REv. 251,
259.
210. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 3(1) (Eng.).
211. Id. § 6(1).
212. RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME, supra note 124, 3.6; see also Robert Blackburn, A Hu-
man Rights Committee for the U.K. Parliament-The Options, 1998 EUR. Hum. RTS. L. REV. 534.
213. 583 PARL. DEB., H.L. (Lord Irvine) (5th ser.) (1997) 1150.
214. 608 PARL. DEB., H.L. (Lord Bassam) (5th ser.) (2000) 485.
215. Compare Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.) with Intelligence Services Act, 1994,
c. 13, § 10 (Eng.).
216. CriminalJustice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act, 1998, c. 40 (Eng.).
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killed 28 people and injured at least 220 others.,17 British Minis-
ter Tony Blair announced in a speech in Omagh on August 25,
1998, that Parliament would be recalled to consider new anti-
terrorism legislation. The draft Criminal Justice (Terrorism and
Conspiracy) Bill was published by the Home Office on the even-
ing of September 1. By September 4, it had received Royal
Assent, ironically just as the Human Rights Bill of 1997-19982I8
was due to reach its final stages in Parliament.29 Despite protesta-
tions to the contrary by Government ministers, it is arguable that
some provisions in sections 1 to 4 are incompatible with Article 6
of the European Convention concerning fair trials and the pre-
sumption of innocence. Inferences from silence, as opposed to
the direct criminalization of silence during investigation, are not
per se a breach of the Convention 22 or wider common law immu-
nities. Nevertheless, the fairness of drawing adverse inferences
depends on the circumstances, including effective access to legal
advice, disclosure of the police's evidence, and the availability of
explanations in judgments, none of which is assured in the appli-
cation of the 1998 Criminal Justice Act. 2 2 That such a measure
could be passed so easily in the shadow of the Human Rights Act,
when the Home Secretary gave every assurance there was no
breach, does not bode well for the current levels of institutional
entrenchment.
D. Applicability of Rights
1. Public Authorities-The Human Rights Act applies to "public
authorities"; under section 6(1): "[i]t is unlawful for a public
authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention
right."223 This raises two issues: What is meant by "public authority"
and what actions would be "incompatible" with the new statutory
217. Martin Fletcher, Massacre of the Innocent, TIMES (London), Aug. 17, 1998, at 1-2.
For a history of the group, see Peter Taylor, The Secret Power Struggie that Spawned Omagh,
TIMES (London), Aug. 25, 1998, at 15.
218. Human Rights Bill, 1997-1998, H.L. No. 38.
219. Clive Walker, The Bombs in Omagh and Their Aftermath, 62 MOD. L. REv. 879, 879-80
(1999).
220. See Saunders v. United Kingdom, App. No. 19187/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313, 327-
31 (1997).
221. See Heaney v. Ireland, [19971 1 1.L.R.M. 117, 120 (Ir. S.C.). But see People v. Cull,
[1980] 2 Frewen 36, 40.
222. See Murray v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18731/91, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29, 44-45
(1996).
223. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 6 (Eng.).
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duty? The Act includes a broad definition of "public authority" in
section 6:
(3) In this section "public authority" includes-
(a) a court or tribunal, and
(b) any person certain of whose functions are
functions of a public nature, but does not in-
clude either House of Parliament or a person
exercising functions in connection with pro-
ceedings in Parliament.
(4) In subsection (3) "Parliament" does not include the
House of Lords in its judicial capacity." 4
The phrase in section 6(3) (b) certainly includes local and cen-
tral government. Other authorities exercising public functions
could include utilities companies and prisons operated by correc-
tions corporations. The definition expressly includes the courts, 5
as well as the House of Lords in its judicial capacity. Parliament,
except the (judicial) Appellate Committee of the House of Lords,
is expressly not part of the definition of "public authority." Reflect-
ing the constitutional settlement inherent in the Human Rights
Act, Parliament can choose to override or disregard rights. Parlia-
ment may also decide not to introduce amending legislation to
provide effective rights, and is so excused by section 6 of the Hu-
man Rights Act. That portion of section 6 provides:
(6): "An act" includes a failure to act but does not in-
clude a failure to-
(a) introduce in, or lay before, Parliament a pro-
posal for legislation; or
(b) make any primary legislation or remedial or-
der. 
2 6
Along the same lines, a public authority is excused from its
normal duties if it could not act in any other way because of clear
primary legislation:
(2): Subsection (1) does not apply to an act if-
(a) as the result of one or more provisions of pri-
mary legislation, the authority could not have
acted differently; or
224. Id. § 6(3)-(4).
225. Id.
226. Id. § 6(6).
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(b) in the case of one or more provisions of, or
made under, primary legislation which cannot
be read or given effect in a way which is com-
patible with the Convention rights, the
authority was acting so as to give effect to or
227enforce those provisions.
The limitation of the duty to public authorities naturally reflects
the impact of the European Convention, which delineates rela-
tionships between an individual and a state. While many of the
Articles under the Convention are worded sufficiently broadly to
apply to private infringements of rights, the system only accepts
as admissible complaints against a High Contracting Party under
Article 34, that is, complaints alleging some kind of state in-
volvement or responsibility.2s The state is responsible for actions
by state agents within their discretion and for actions by third par-
ties in so far as those parties operate under laws enacted by the
state 229 or where the state has failed to take action against inde-
pendent violations of rights by those third parties.23 Attacks on
rights may not always come from governments but may arise, for
example, from the infringement of privacy by the media or dis-
crimination by a private employer or provider of goods and
services. The Human Rights Act seems to impose liability on a
wide, arguably sophisticated basis; it seeks to impose state respon-
sibility on a functional rather than hierarchical basis. With the
prevalence of new public management, this approach is prudent.
Likewise, Andrew Clapham suggests that the rights instrument en-
sures a remedy for harm arising from a breach of rights, whatever
the role of the state in causing the breach .
This expansive view as to who possesses duties under the Human
Rights Act only is partially reflected elsewhere. For example, in
Canada, the courts have refused to entertain claims against third
227. Id. § 6(2).
228. Eleventh Protocol, supra note 179, at art. 34. Article 34 states: "The Court may re-
ceive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals
claiming to be the ictim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights
set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties under-
take not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right." Id.
229. See Young v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7601/76, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 38, 51-55
(1982) (involving a challenge to enforced membership of a trade union as part of a closed
shop agreement).
230. This form of liability especially arises in connection with privacy rights under Arti-
cle 8. See ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 134 (1993); HARRIS
ET AL., supra note 12, at 19-22.
231. CLAPHAM, supra note 230.
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parties such as estate trustees,2 3 2 closed shop agreements,233 and
secondary picketing;234 however, a hockey association receiving
state grants was subjected to Charter requirements, 2 35 as was a pri-
vate university with a supervisory body appointed by the
government. 26 In the United States, problems have arisen with
company towns where all open and public spaces are owned by a
private company that has prohibited meetings and demonstra-
tions. In Marsh v. Alabama37 the Supreme Court held First
Amendment rights can apply in those circumstances. Access will be
denied, however, if speech activity is incompatible with a private
purpose such as picketing in a shopping center.3 s Similarly, the
European Commission has asserted in Anderson v. United Kingdom1 9
that there is no right to gather for social purposes in a commercial
shopping center.
More difficult cases involve public universities; they have
traditionally claimed independence from the state, but in their
dealings at least with students whose degree programs are approved
and funded under legal terms, they are considered public
authorities. There was also much debate in Parliament about the
position of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the
Press Complaints Commission. The BBC will likely be treated as a
public authority in many of its activities; it acts as a public service
broadcaster under its Royal Charter, 240 as implemented by a License
and Agreement from the Home Secretary,24' and is largely funded
by a license fee levied on all owners of television sets.2 42 While most
232. See Re Peg-Win Real Estate Ltd., [1986] 27 D.L.R. 767, 768 (Can.), dismissing appeal
from [1985] 19 D.L.R. 438 (Can.).
233. See ReBhindi, [1986] 29 D.L.R. (4th) 47, 56 (Can.).
234. See Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.,
[1987] 33 D.L.R. 174, 191-99 (Can.).
235. See Re Blainey, [1985] 26 D.L.R. 728, 748 (Can.).
236. See Re Lavigne, [1986 29 D.L.R. 321, 383-93 (Can.).
237. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
238. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976); But cf Lee v. Int'l Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 830 (1992) (holding that a ban on distribution of literature
in Port Authority airports was invalid under the First Amendment).
239. App. No. 33689/96, 91 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 79, 82 (1997); see also
Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, Civil Rights, Civil Wrongs and Quasi-Public Space, 1999 EUR.
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 46, 49.
240. BBC Royal Charter, 1981, Cmnd. 8313. For its origins and history, see BROADCAST-
ING COMMITTEE, REPORT, 1923, Cmnd. 1951; COMMITTEE ON THE FUTURE OF
BROADCASTING, REPORT, 1977, Cmnd. 6753; ASA BRIGGS, THE HISTORY OF BROADCASTING
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, VOlS. 1-5 (1995); ToM BURNS, THE BBC: PUBLIC INSTITUTION AND
PRIVATE WORLD (1977).
241. License and Agreement, 1981, Cmnd. 8233.
242. See Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1949, c. 54 (Eng.); COMMITTEE ON FINANCING THE
BBC, REPORT, 1986, Cm. 9824; HOME DEPARTMENT, BROADCASTING IN THE '90S, 1988, Cm.
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privately owned media, whether press or broadcast, are probably
not public authorities, there is concern about the Press Complaints
Commission, which was established in 1991 as a private body
financed by the press to deal with complaints from the public
243about unfair treatment or invasions of privacy. Especially as the
Press Complaints Commission also purports to act in the public
interest, and both the Commission itself and the government see
part of its role as creating standards that would otherwise be
imposed by legislation, the Commission is best classified as a
public authority. This categorization requires the Commission to
consider factors such as rights to privacy and freedom of
expression.2 44 This balancing is part of its everyday functions and so
should not cause problems. 245 The Commission's Chairman, Lord
Wakeham, feared, however, that the effect of the Human Rights
Act would be to upset the nature of self-regulation because the
courts could become involved, and dissatisfied customers would be
tempted to go to the courts directly as they can award injunctions
and damages that a self-regulatory body is unable to offer.246 In
order to avoid these problems, various special protections are
given by section 12, though confined to civil proceedings:
(1) This section applies if a court is considering
whether to grant any relief which, if granted, might
affect the exercise of the Convention right to free-
dom of expression.
(2) If the person against whom the application for re-
lief is made ("the respondent") is neither present
nor represented, no such relief is to be granted un-
less the court is satisfied-
(a) that the applicant has taken all practicable
steps to notify the respondent; or
517; DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL HERITAGE, THE FUTURE OF THE BBC, 1992, Cm. 2098;
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL HERITAGE, THE FUTURE OF THE BBC, 1994, Cm. 2621.
243. See Press Complaints Commission, at http://www.pcc.org.uk (last visited Sept. 3,
2000) (detailing the Code of Practice) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform). For its history, see generally the COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND RELATED MATTERS,
FIRST REPORT, 1990, Cm. 1102; COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND RELATED MATTERS, SECOND
REPORT, 1993, Cm. 2135; House of Commons National Heritage Select Committee, Privacy
and Media Intrusion, 3 H.C. JOUR. 294 (1992); Sir Louis Blom-Cooper & Lisa R. Pruitt, Pri-
vacy Jurisprudence of the Press Complaints Commission, 23 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 133 (1994); Colin
Munro, Press Freedom: How the Beast Was Tamed, 54 MoD. L. REv. 104 (1991); Cheryl Reid,
Press Censorship in the 1990s: The Calcutt Report and the Protection of Individual Privacy, 43 N. IR.
LEGAL Q. 99 (1992); Note, Self-Regulation in the Media, 1997 PUB. L. 6.
244. SeeHuman Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, sched. 1, arts. 8, 10 (Eng.).
245. See 583 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 784.
246. Id. at 771.
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(b) that there are compelling reasons why the re-
spondent should not be notified.
(3) No such relief is to be granted so as to restrain pub-
lication before trial unless the court is satisfied that
the applicant is likely to establish that publication
should not be allowed.
(4) The court must have particular regard to the im-
portance of the Convention right to freedom of
expression and, where the proceedings relate to
material which the respondent claims, or which ap-
pears to the court, to be journalistic, literary or
artistic material (or to conduct connected with such
material), to-
(a) the extent to which-
(i) the material has, or is about to, become
available to the public; or
(ii) it is, or would be, in the public interest
for the material to be published;
(b) any relevant privacy code.2 7
It is far from clear what the "particular... importance" of free-
dom of expression under subsection (4) is meant to be, as the
issues related in (a) are largely culled from existing Strasbourg
case law. 48 In addition, reliance to any degree upon the code of
practice issued by the Commission, a code without legislative back-
ing by a body which has no standing in law, seems undemocratic
and a potential hostage to fortune. 49 On the other hand, the pro-
hibition on the issuance of interim injunctions in the absence of
press advocates and the shifting of the burden of proof from prima
facie case to proof of likely success at trial are useful reforms.
The passage of the Human Rights Act also excited the attention
of various churches that lobbied for protection for the continu-
ance of religious practices. Some representations arose out of fears
that for example, the Catholic Church or the Church of England,
both of which operate schools funded by the state and thereby act
as public authorities, would have to accommodate persons from
247. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 12 (Eng.).
248. See, e.g., Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep.
245 (1979); Observer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13585/88, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 153
(1992).
249. Cf. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 45-50 (arguing that the
rights conferred by the Human Rights Act operate only as supplements to existing rights
and remedies and in no way function as a substitute for such rights).
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other religions in their schools in order to avoid charges of dis-
crimination under Article 14.50 Similar problems were feared in
regard to the selective ordination of priests (women being dis-
barred in the Catholic church) and the officiation at marriages
(where homosexual couples are not allowed). 25 These concerns
are almost certainly excessive, for Article 9 of the Convention ex-
pressly protects freedom of conscience and religion.' 2
Nevertheless, a general reassurance is given by section 13 of the
Human Rights Act: "If a court's determination of any question aris-
ing under this Act might affect the exercise by a religious
organisation (itself or its members collectively) of the Convention
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, it must have
particular regard to the importance of that right.'
53
Again, the meaning of "particular ... importance" is most ob-
scure, and section 13 is best viewed as a political contrivance; but as
far as the law is concerned, it "serves no sensible purpose.,254
2. Duties Under the Act-The Human Rights Act takes an expan-
sive view of those "public authorities" who possess duties, perhaps
even more expansive than the Convention. The courts' duty as a
public authority is an appropriate illustration of this point, as the
courts are pivotal institutions in the application of the Act.
As already indicated, the courts must take account of the Con-
vention in their interpretation and application of statutory
255materials under section 3. More generally, the courts are ex-
pressly "public authorities" under section 6(3) of the Act. This
means that, even when not dealing with statutory materials gov-
erned by section 3, the courts must still avoid acting in any way
incompatible with the Convention. This instruction applies both to
procedures under which court work is constructed and also to the
substantive determination of the law, in so far as it does not fall
within the rules under section 3. The result would seem to be that
the courts cannot ignore the Convention even in litigation involv-
ing common law and litigation that does not directly involve the
250. European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 14. By Article 14: "[t]he enjoyment of
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination
on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status."
Id.
251. For the views of the Church of England, see generally the Church of England
website, at http://www.church-of-england.org/view/index.html.
252. European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 9; see also David Pannick, Churches
Granted Unwise Safeguard, TIMES (London),June 2, 1998, at 35.
253. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 13 (Eng.).
254. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 50-51.
255. See supra note 131.
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state as a party. Consequently, one expects the Convention to have
a substantial indirect influence on private litigation, what is re-
ferred to as a "horizontal effect."26 Lord Chancellor Irvine
supports this interpretation arguing that: "It is right as a matter of
principle for the courts to have the duty of ruling compatibility
with the Convention not only in cases involving other public
authorities but also in developing the common law in deciding
cases between individuals. 
2 57
For example, the impact of the Human Rights Act may be felt in
the development of the laws of libel with regard to such issues as the
258level of damages and the extent of the qualified privilege defense
arising from political commentaries on political issues. Internet
service providers may also find new avenues of regulation of their
contracts with customers. In this way, the Human Rights Act be-
comes a pervasive influence in not only vertical relationships with
the state but also in horizontal relationships between citizens.
3. Right Holders-The discussion turns now from who has a duty
to protect rights under the Act to who has the power to enforce
rights. A rights claim can only be raised by a "victim. 260 This seems
an unduly narrow rule of standing. The concept comes from the
European Convention2 6 1 and is understood within a complex
system of international law, but not within domestic law, especially
within a jurisdiction where forms of public funding for civil
256. See, e.g., Nicholas Bamforth, The Application of the Human Rights Act of 1998 to Public
Authorities and Private Bodies, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 159, 160 (1999); Gareth Davies, The
"Horizontal"Effect of the Human Rights Act, 150 NEw L.J. 839, 840 (2000); Murray Hunt, The
"Horizontal Effect" of the Human Rights Act, 1998 PUB. L. 423, 435-42; Gordon Nardell, Collat-
eral Thinking: The Human Rights Act and Public Law Defences, 1999 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REv.
293, 294-300; Gavin Phillipson, The Human Rights Act, Horizontal Effect and the Common Law:
A Bang or a Whimper?, 62 MOD. L. REV. 824, 825-44 (1999). See generally H.W.R. Wade, Hori-
zons of Horizontality, 116 L.Q. REv. 217 (2000). But see Sir Richard Buxton, The Human Rights
Act and Private Law, 116 L.Q. REv. 48, 57 (2000) (expressing doubt concerning the
"horizontal effect").
257. 583 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 783; see also COPPEL, supra note 10, at 26; Wil-
liam Wade, Opinion: Human Rights and the Judiciary, 1998 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 520, 524.
258. See, e.g., Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18139/91, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 442
(1995).
259. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, 3 W.L.R. 1010 (H.L. 1999).
260. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 7 (Eng.).
261. Eleventh Protocol, supra note 179, at art. 34. Article 34 states:
The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisa-
tion or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the
High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols
thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effec-
tive exercise of this right.
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litigants are already diminished considerably. 62 The rule of standing
is notably more restrictive than that applying to judicial review in
English administrative law, which allows applications by a person
with "sufficient interest,"26 but is one that is intended to rule out
most forms of actio popularis.264 It is also probably narrower than the
American concept of some "personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy,, 265 though it is arguable that large numbers of citizens
equally could be victimized by some breaches of rights.
2 6 6
A related issue is the extent to which class actions will be al-
lowed. Class action suits are important in rights claims in order to
maximize the evidential docket while at the same time spreading
costs. The concept is of course well established in United States
jurisdictions26' but is not common in English or Convention law.
Furthermore, a special problem relates to claims of breaches of
rights affecting children. Many of the child-related actions under
the Convention have been brought by parents, and it remains to
be seen whether the English courts will be so relaxed in assuming
that the parents always represent the best interests of the child .2m
Beginning in the early 1980's the European Court of Human
Rights moderated the impact of some of its restrictive rules about
standing by allowing amicus curiae submissions on an increasingly
generous scale.2 69 For example, the Trades Union Congress made
oral and written submissions in Young v. United Kingdom7 concern-
262. See Access to justice Act, 1999, c. 22, § 8 (Eng.).
263. Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 31 (Eng.); Supreme Court Rules, (1977) SI
1955/1776. According to rule 3(7), "[t]he Court shall not grant leave unless it considers that
the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates." Supreme
Court Rules, (1977) SI 1955/1776.
264. For the position under the Convention, see HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 633.
Compare this position with the position in English administrative law where interest groups
have been allowed to mount actions. See Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Self-
Employed and Small Bus. Ltd., 1982 A.C. 617, 624; Regina v. Secretary of State for the Env't
exparte Rose Theatre Co., 1 All E.R. 754 (1990).
265. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 579 (1992); Int'l Primate Protection League v. Adm'r of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500
U.S. 72, 77 (1991); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972).
266. See, e.g., Open Door Counselling v. Ireland, App. Nos. 14234/88, 14235/88, 15
Eur. H.R. Rep. 244 (1993); Norris v. Ireland, App. No. 10581/83, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186
(1991); Soc'y for the Prot. of Unborn Children v. Coogan, [1990] 10 I.L.R.M. 70; Soc'y for
the Prot. of Unborn Children v. Grogan, [1990] 10 I.L.R.M. 350; Hilton v. United Kingdom,
57 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 108 (1988); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No.
7525/76, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1982);Johnston v. Ireland, App. No. 9607/82, 8 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 214 (1986).
267. See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982).
268. See Fortin, supra note 125, at 369-70.
269. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 668.
270. App. No. 7601/76, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 38 (1980).
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ing closed shop agreements. In Malone v. United Kingdom,27' the
Court allowed an intervention by the Post Office Engineers' Un-
ion. Submissions have been allowed many times since; it seems a
desirable mechanism within the context of constitutional litigation
to allow third parties to draw attention to the wider implications of
the case. 72 Once more, it remains to be seen whether the English
courts will follow suit, as amicus curiae briefs have not been encour-
aged previously, especially as they seem to undermine the impetus
toward the management of litigation and defining issues as nar-
273
rowly as possible. However, English judges have wide discretion
in managing their courts, and amicus curiae briefs have been admit-
ted from time to time. One notable example concerns the
extradition hearings in relation to General Pinochet of Chile,
where the court accepted submissions from Amnesty Interna-
tional.274
Though the concept of "victim" is narrow in some senses, it is
quite broad in others. In particular, it can allow companies and
associations to bring claims where rights are not confined to
human individuals. The extent to which this is the case depends on
the wording of each right. Some Convention rights expressly refer
to legal "persons," especially the property rights in Article 1 of the
First Protocol, 2 75 and so many of the applications under this
provision have been from corporate interests. 216 Some rights are
said to be for "everyone;" this phrase is used by articles 10 and 11
of the Human Rights Act.277 Thus, campaign groups and large
media conglomerates can avail themselves of rights to freedom of
expression,27s while freedom of association can apply to protest
271. App. No. 8691/79,7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 (1985).
272. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (limits on the working hours of
women; brief by Louis B. Brandeis) (1908); In re Canadian Labour Congress & Bhindi
[1985] 17 D.L.R. 193, 197 (challenge to closed shop agreement; intervention by the Cana-
dian Labour Congress) (Can.).
273. See generally LORD JUSTICE HARRY WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT
(1996).
274. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Mag. ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2), 2
W.L.R. 272, 274 (1999).
275. First Protocol, supra note 50, at art. 1. Article 1 states that "[e]very natural or legal
person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by
law and by the general principles of international law." Id.
276. These include the first reported individual application against the United King-
dom. A. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3039/67, 10 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 506 (1967)
(Commission report), noted in D.R. Gilmour, The Sovereignty of Parliament and the European
Commission of Human Rights, 1968 PUB. L. 62, 63 n.8.
277. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, sched. 1, arts. 10, 11 (Eng.).
278. Compare Leigh v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10039/82, 38 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 74 (1984) (challenging the restriction of documents used in court legal pro-
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organizations. Other rights clearly are confined to "men and
women," such as the right to marry under article 12.28 ° Although
United States companies can generally claim constitutional
rights, 21  other jurisdictions have been more circumspect in
allowing this for fear that corporate power will be used contrary to
the interests of individuals.2
III. THE ROLE OF THEJUDICIARY AND
THE CREATION OF REMEDIES
The basic duty of the judiciary (including all tribunals) is not to
act in any way incompatible with a Convention right.2 3 In addition,
the interpretation of statutory materials must explicitly take the
Convention into account. 24 Convention rights include not only
those listed in schedule 1 but also, according to section 2(1), any:
(a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion
of the European Court of Human Rights,
(b) opinion of the Commission given in a report
adopted under Article 31 of the Convention,
(c) decision of the Commission in connection with
Article 26 or 27(2) of the Convention, or
(d) decision of the Committee of Ministers taken under
Article 46 of the Convention . 28
In this way, the English courts can no longer simply say that the
law is clear and that reference to the Convention is therefore not
necessary. As far as public authorities such as the courts are con-
cerned, they always have a duty to refer to the Convention, so it
becomes a relevant consideration in almost any conceivable litiga-
tion, even in litigation between purely private parties who are
themselves under no duty to act compatibly with the Convention.
ceedings), with Open Door Counselling v. Ireland, App. Nos. 14234/88, 14235/88, 15 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 244 (1993) (challenging a restriction on information about abortion).
279. See, e.g., Christians Against Racism and Fascism v. United Kingdom, App. No.
8440/78, 21 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 138 (1981).
280. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, sched. 1, art. 12 (Eng.).
281. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
282. See CONSTITUTION REVIEW GROUP, REPORT, 1996, Pn. 2632, at 222-27 (Dublin);
Parkdale Hotel, Ltd. v. Att'y Gen. of Canada, [1986] 27 D.L.R. 19 (Can.); E. Donegal Corp.
v. Att'y Gen. [1970] I.R. 317; AILEEN MCCOLGAN, WOMEN UNDER THE LAW (1999).
283. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 6 (Eng.).
284. Id. § 3.
285. Id.§ 2(1).
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The courts must interpret the laws in a manner that is consistent
with their interpretations of the requirements of the Convention.
In practical terms, this will extend the indirect impact of the Con-
vention into English law by ensuring it can come into play in all
cases, including those cases where a statute is clear within its own
terms or where common law is settled. Due to its vague nature,
however, the Convention rarely would serve as a basis for per se vio-
lations). Additionally, arguments based upon the Convention are
more likely to be raised in English courts in order to ensure the
exhaustion of domestic remedies, so as to permit a subsequent ap-
plication to the Strasbourg court.
A. Interpretative Principles
Under the Human Rights Act, we can expect English judges to
apply the commonly used principles and interpretative devices
used by the Strasbourg court.2 16 These include a teleological
approach to the meaning of the Convention , which is to be
treated as a living and developing document 2s and a generous
approach to the scope of rights. Due regard should be given to
the importance of the right in question: some are treated as
absolute,2 some as fundamental2 0 and some more provisional.291
Restrictions on rights should be subjected to established
tests such as "proportionality, 292  being "prescribed by
286. See COPPEL, supra note 10, at 137-40 (outlining methods of interpreting the Con-
vention); Paul Mahoney, Principles of Judicial Review as Developed by the European Court of
Human Rights, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998, 65 (Lammy Betten ed., 1999). See generally
Peter Duffy, The European Convention on Human Rights, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM (Jack Beatson et al. eds., 1998); David Pannick, Principles of Interpretation of
Convention Rights Under the Human Rights Act and the Discretionary Area ofJudgment, 1998 PUB.
L. 545.
287. SeeVienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, at
art. 31 (listing general rules of interpretation for international treaties).
288. To give an example, forms of corporal punishment were seen in 1950 as quite
commonplace and acceptable. By 1982, however, there was a strong presumption against
such punishment and the European Court ruled against its infliction based on Article 3 of
the Convention. See, e.g., Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1,
10 (1980).
289. See European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 3.
290. See id. at arts. 2, 5, 6.
291. See id. at arts. 8-11.
292. See, e.g., Steel v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24838/94, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 603, 621-
23 (1998) (finding Article 5(1)(a) requires a sufficient causal link between conviction and
detention); see also Breach of Human Rights in Arrest for Peaceful Protest TIMES (London), Oct.
1, 1998 at 43. The public authority's decision must make sense in terms of the objectives to
be achieved. This is a stricter standard of review than normally applied by English courts in
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law,, 29 3  "necessary in a democratic society," 294  and non-
2915discriminatory. Some concepts, however, such as the "margin of
appreciation," make sense only in an international context and
should not be replicated.
96
Overall, we must expect to see a teleological, dynamic, pur-
posive approach based on achieving values, rather than a literal
and historical approach as illustrated in English common law.
B. Interpretative Processes
The interplay of sections 2, 3 and 6 in the Human Rights Act is
both subtle and complex. Their first implication is arguably a
presumption in favor of compatibility: that English law as it stands
at present generally complies with the requirements of the
Convention. This might be argued from section 6(1), worded as a
duty not to act incompatibly rather than a duty to strive for
compatibility. For the future, compatibility can be assured in
almost all cases by the processes of interpretation that are required
by the Human Rights Act. It is suggested, by reference to section
3(1), that the first step in the interpretative process is to examine
English law in light of settled Convention jurisprudence. Thus, the
interpretation of the Convention is left to English courts at this
stage, and interpretations that are compatible should be preferred
to interpretations that are incompatible. The question arises as to
how far the judiciary will be prepared to strain the natural meaning
judicial review. See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., 1 K.B.
223, 228-29 (1948). The standard of scrutiny has, however, been raised when human fights
are at stake. See, e.g., Regina v. Lord Saville of Newdigate ex parte A., 4 All E.R. 860, 879-80
(1999) (finding that a decision maker was not entitled to reach a decision that risked inter-
fering with fundamental human rights in the absence of a justification and that the court
would "anxiously scrutinize" such a decision).
293. Silver v. United Kingdom, App. No. 594772, 6205/73, 7052/75, 7061/75, 7107/75,
7113/75, 71361/75, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 347, 371 (1983) (holding that to be prescribed by law,
the provision (i) must have a basis in domestic law, (ii) must be accessible, in other words,
be available to be read and readily comprehensible, (iii) must be sufficiently precise as to be
foreseeable to an ordinary citizen in its application); see also Malone v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14, 40 (1984) (arguing that the "law" cannot include
non-statutory codes or practices).
294. The objective pursued by the restriction of rights is compatible with a democratic
society and serves a pressing social need that outweighs the trump cards of rights. See, e.g.,
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 162 (1982) (finding
Northern Ireland's designation of homosexuality as a criminal offence infringed rights to
privacy and was altered by the Homosexual Offences Order, (1982) SI 1982/1356 (N.I.)).
295. See Dudgeon, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 162.
296. See id. at 164.
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of words. This problem has been faced in regard to European
Community law, and some suggest that the adopted meaning of
words can be strained and far from obvious, but not to an undue
extent. 297 The process of achieving compatibility can next be aided
by the legal requirement under section 2 (1) only to "take into
account" the established jurisprudence of the Convention. This
means that settled Strasbourg interpretations are not strictly
binding in English law, so English courts may decide to shape the
interpretation of the Convention in a way that can then relate back
to the preferred interpretation of English law.298 In reality, it is
likely that the two steps will be mixed together, but it probably
would be best to avoid too much inventiveness in regard to
Convention jurisprudence, as there remains the possibility that
English law will later be declared in Strasbourg to be incompatible
with the Convention.
C. Procedures
Convention rights can be raised as an argument in any court,
from the highest to the lowest, or official tribunal in two ways un-
der section 7:
(1) A person who claims that a public authority has
acted (or proposes to act) in a way which is made
unlawful by section 6(1) may-
(a) bring proceedings against the authority under
this Act in the appropriate court or tribunal,
or
(b) rely on the Convention right or rights con-
cerned in any legal proceedings, but only if he
is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful act.2 99
In most cases, the rights claim will be part of an argument about
interpretation, asking for one meaning to be adopted rather than
297. See, e.g., Lord Anthony Lester, Opinion: The Art of the Possible-Interpreting Statutes
Under the Human Rights Act, 1998 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 665. Compare Macarthys Ltd. v.
Smith, 1 All E.R. 111 (1981) (holding that European Court's opinion takes priority over
English court's decision about the meaning of the English Equal Pay Act, enacted under the
Treaty of Rome), with Garland v. British Rail Eng'g, 2 A.C. 751 (1983) (finding that the Sex
Discrimination Act of 1975 should be construed to carry out the obligations of the Treaty of
Rome).
298. The breadth ofjudicial discretion is thus greater than it might first appear. See gen-
erally Ewing, supra note 10.
299. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 7 (Eng.).
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another by relying upon the Convention but not by basing the liti-
gation specifically upon it.30 1 Probably the most common example
of this scenario will be arguments in criminal prosecutions.30' The
prosecution is, of course, not founded on the Human Rights Act
but is based on a breach of criminal laws. The defendant, however,
may seek to raise rights arguments at various stages-for example,
by suggesting that a failure to disclose
3 2 the use of entrapment, M3
or undue media attention 304 should result in the courts declaring
an abuse of process. At trial, the defendant may use rights argu-
ments, such as the denial of access to a lawyer, as the basis for
excluding prosecutorial evidence. 0 5
In a small number of cases, where there might be a direct chal-
lenge to the compatibility of the English statute (or a prerogative
order)30 6 with the Convention right, the litigation is brought under
the authority of the Human Rights Act, section 7(1) (a).07 In this
scenario, the Convention right is the sole or principal argument,
and the challenge is that any conceivable meaning of the law is in-
compatible with the Convention. Such a challenge can only be
made in a higher court, not a first instance criminal court or a lo-
cal civil court.3)" The process has a similar status to judicial review
in administrative proceedings.3 0 9 So if such a challenge arises in
combination with proceedings at such a court, the magistrate or
relevant judge would adjourn the case pending such a challenge
300. Id.§7(1)(b).
301. See generally Ben Emmerson, Crime and Human Rights, 149 NEw L.J. 1899 (1999),
continued at 150 NEW L.J. 13 (2000).
302. See, e.g., Rowe v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28901/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1997), avail
able at http://www.echr.coe.int.; Edwards v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13071/87, 15 Eur.
H.R. 417, 431-32 (1992). See generally Sybil D. Sharpe, Article 6 and the Disclosure of Evidence in
Criminal Trials, 1999 CRIM. L. REv. 273.
303. See, e.g., Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal, App. No. 25829/94, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 101,
109-11 (1998). See generally Andrew Ashworth, Article 6 and the Fairness of Trials, 1999 CRIM.
L. REV. 261 (advocating that the Convention be read without exclusive reference to the
jurisprudence of the European Court and recognizing that the European Court's decisions
have their own structure).
304. See, e.g., Venables v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 24724/94, 24888/94 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1999), available at http://www.echr.coe.int (holding breach of article 6 for trial of
children in an adult court). For an example of the extensive coverage of the case, see gen-
erally the TIMES (London), Dec. 17, 1999.
305. See, e.g., Murray v. United Kingdom, App No. 18731/91, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29
(1996).
306. See, e.g., Council of Civil Serv. Unions v. Minister for the Civil Serv., [1985] 1 A.C.
374 (Eng. C.A.); see also Clive Walker, Review of the Prerogative: The Remaining Issues, 1987
PUB. L. 62, 62-63, 66-67.
307. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 7(1)(a) (Eng.).
308. Id.§ 7(2).
309. See Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 31 (Eng.); Supreme Court Rules, (1977) SI
1955/1776.
[VOL. 33:4
The United Kingdom Bill of Rights 1998
and its resolution in the upper court. If any case does arise, notice
must be given to the Crown under section 5 of the Human Rights
Act: "Where a court is considering whether to make a declaration
of incompatibility, the Crown is entitled to notice in accordance
with rules of court. 30 ° The Crown may always intervene in the case
and is given rights of appeal against a declaration of incompatibil-
ity. If the higher court3 accepts the argument of incompatibility,
then it can issue a formal declaration of incompatibility.3" In the
case of a statute under challenge, the declaration does not invali-
date the law, since courts are not given the power to invalidate (or
even disapply) legislation out of respect to parliamentary sover-
eignty and its democratic mandate. 3 There is also a savings clause
in section 3:
(2) This section-
(a) applies to primary legislation and subordinate
legislation whenever enacted;
(b) does not affect the validity, continuing opera-
tion or enforcement of any incompatible
primary legislation; and
(c) does not affect the validity, continuing opera-
tion or enforcement of any incompatible
subordinate legislation if (disregarding any
possibility of revocation) primary legislation
prevents removal of the incompatibility.
3 14
The position in regard to the specific parties in the case is also
preserved by section 4(6) (a), which states that the declaration
"does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement
of the provision in respect of which it is given. '31 5 It is also "not
,,316binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is made, sothat the litigation can still be determined on the basis of legislation
310. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 5 (Eng.).
311. Id. § 4(5).
312. Id.§4(2).
313. See I. Loveland, Incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights into United
Kingdom Law, 52 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 111, 116 (1999). As a result, a court has stronger
remedies in the case of incompatibility with European Communities law, since the United
Kingdom Act of Parliament may then be disapplied. See, e.g., Regina v. Secretary of State for
Transp. ex parte Factortame Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 818 (E.C.J. 1990) (granting an injunction to stop
the application of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1988 against Spanish fishing vessel own-
ers). See generally Marie Demetriou, Using Human Rights Through European Community Law,
1999 EUR. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 484.
314. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 3(2) (Eng.).
315. Id.§4(6) (a).
316. Id.§4(6)(b).
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which has been declared incompatible with human rights. The in-
compatibility is for the judges to discern, but it is for Parliament to
consider whether to remedy under a rule of "imperfect obliga-
tion."3 17 Though Parliament is not duty-bound to respond to a
declaration of incompatibility, the government has promised that a
change in the law "almost certainly" will folloW.3 1 1 One can even
imagine the development of a conventional duty to consider such
declarations and to produce a statement in Parliament within a
given time, but this hardly renders ministers into "little more than
judges' runners. 1 19
Secondary legislative instruments can, by contrast, be declared
invalid to the extent of their incompatibility. This condemnation is
not seen as an assault on parliamentary sovereignty, but it is de-
picted as enforcing the will of Parliament as primarily expressed
through Acts of Parliament (such as the Human Rights Act). Eng-
lish courts have long exercised administrative law powers to strike
down delegated legislation."' Section 3 (2) (c), however, preserves
the validity of any incompatible subordinate legislation if it essen-
tially arises from the incompatibility of primary legislation for two
reasons. First, the primary legislation expressly allows incompatible
secondary legislation. Second, and more likely, the whole statutory
scheme is held to be incompatible and the secondary legislation is
in furtherance of the scheme.
The expositions in sections 3 and 4 are exclusively targeted in
terms of the treatment of statutory materials. Consequently, the
position is less straightforward in relation to incompatible com-
mon law principles or rules. While total incompatibility is less
likely because of the greater flexibility and adaptability of com-
mon law, it is possible. The common law has been found at fault
in the case of Malone v. United Kingdom2 in relation to the lack
of a right to privacy, and there are also several examples of
challenges to the common law relating to rape32 3 and
317. David Feldman, The Human Rights Act 1998 and Constitutional Principles, 19 LEGAL
STUD. 165, 187 (1999).
318. 583 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 1139.
319. Ewing, supra note 10, at 88-89.
320. See, e.g., Secretary of State for Educ. v. Tameside M.B.C., 1977 A.C. 1014; Bromley
L.B.C. v. Greater London Council, I All E.R. 129, 134-36 (1982).
321. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 3(2) (c) (Eng.).
322. App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 (1985); see also Halford v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 20605/92, 24 Eur. H. R. Rep 523 (1997); Interception of Office Telephone Calls Is
Breach of Privacy, TMES (London),July 3, 1997, at 46.
323. See, e.g., S.W. v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 20166, 20190/92, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep.
363, 402 (1996) (holding that common law immunity to rape occurring within a marriage
did not apply to situation where wife regarded the marriage as over and the couple slept in
separate quarters).
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libel.324 Given the omission of Article 13, it is doubtful whether the
Act requires that judges now do any more than, in the words of
sections 2 and 6, have regard at all times to Convention rights as
relevant considerations, even the alien value of privacy.2 5 The ex-
pectation seems to be that no fundamental incompatibility will
arise, since the common law allows for sufficient regard to be
taken.
In summary, the courts are not to be given a "strong" form of
judicial review. They may interpret legislation in a way that seeks
to achieve compliance with, or minimal detriment to, rights, but
they will not be able to invalidate inconsistent legislation and cer-
tainly must accept without question later inconsistent legislation
that expressly states that it is to prevail notwithstanding the Bill
of Rights. This result may have disappointed some human rights
champions. Judges themselves, however, have expressed some
hesitation about stepping into these higher profile roles, which
will inevitably expose them to greater political scrutiny of their
backgrounds and their performance.3 26 Furthermore, the records
of English judges who have been asked to look at rights issues are
not always inspiring. This applies especially to the Judicial Com-
mittee of the Privy Council, which hears various Commonwealth
constitutional appeals. For example, in Riley v. Attorney General of
Jamaica, Lords Scarman and Bridge condemned the "austere
legalism" of their colleagues, even though the court has become
more activist in recent years. Limited powers of review also re-
flect a traditional Labour Party distrust of the higher judiciary, as
well as a more positive belief in the supremacy of Parliament and
the distinctness of judicial and political functions. It follows that
there has been little enthusiasm for widening the range of judi-
cial experiences by more "political" appointments or by a special
constitutional court. Nor, as mentioned previously, has the
government embraced the idea of an expert and independent
324. See, e.g., Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18139/91, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep.
442, 468 (1995) (accepting the claim that the size of a libel award suppressed freedom of
expression). But see Fayed v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17101/90, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 393,
436 (1994) (holding limitation on applicant's ability to challenge alleged defamation under
English law did not constitute unjustified denial of fair hearing).
325. See, e.g., Malone v. M.P.C. (No. 2), 1979 Ch. 344 (recognizing privacy rights under
Convention but finding them inapplicable in case where there was no English law against
wire tapping).
326. SeegenerallyJOHN A.G. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THEJUDICIARY (5th ed. 1997).
327. 2 W.L.R. 305 (1982).
328. See generally LEONARD PEACH, INDEPENDENT SCRUTINY OF THE APPOINTMENT
PROCESSES OF JUDGES AND QUEEN'S COUNSEL (Lord Chancellor's Department, London,
1999).
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Human Rights Commission.3 2 9 This idea is both widely sup-
ported330 and widely utilized in other, comparable jurisdictions.33'
Such Commissions have several advantages, such as the possibility
of proactive intervention and the gathering of expertise. Perhaps
they lack the authority of judges, and so can be more easily ig-
nored than legal judgments. This was certainly in part the
experience of the Standing Advisory Commission on Human
Rights332 established in 1973 in Northern Ireland, which was re-
placed by a Human Rights Commission under the Northern
Ireland Act of 1998. 333 This device would again take direction away
from the politicians, as well as perhaps complicating the work of
existing bodies such as the Commission for Racial Equality and the
Equal Opportunities Commission.334 The only exception is North-
ern Ireland, where special circumstances apply and distance from
local politics is currently seen as desirable.
D. Remedies
1. Judicial Remedies-Section 8 of the Human Rights Act allows
the courts to award any existing remedy and compensation for a
breach of Convention rights, whether the challenge arises from
interpretation or incompatibility: 335 "In relation to any act (or pro-
posed act) of a public authority which the court finds is (or would
be) unlawful, it may grant such relief or remedy, or make such or-
der, within its powers as it considers just and appropriate."3 36
329. See supra text accompanying notes 212-16.
330. See generally ROBERT BLACKBURN & ROBERT PLANT, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
(1999); IAN BYNOE & SARAH SPENCER, A HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (1998).
331. See Canadian Human Rights Act, 1976-77, 25-26, Eliz. 2, c. 25 (Can.); Human
Rights Commission Act, 1977-82 (1977 No. 49, 1982 No. 77) (N.Z.); Human Rights Com-
mission Act, 1981, No. 24 (Austl.).
332. Northern Ireland Constitution Act, 1973, c. 36, § 20 (Eng.). See generally Paul R.
Maguire, The Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights 1973-80, 32 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 31
(1981).
333. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47 (Eng.). See generally Northern Ireland Human
Rights Commission website, available at http://www.nihrc.org/index.htm. The Commission
has a large agenda: to keep rights under review; to advise on the compatibility of Northern
Ireland Assembly bills; to promote human rights; to start investigations and bring proceed-
ings; to assist individuals; and to investigate the need for a specific Northern Ireland bill of
rights.
334. SeeRIGHTS BROUGHT HOME, supra note 124, 3.10.
335. See David Feldman, Remedies for Violation of Convention Rights Under the Human Rights
Act, 1998 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. Rv. 691, 698; Ian Leigh & Laurence Lustgarten, Making Rights
Realk The Courts, Remedies and the Human Rights Act, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 509, 536 (1998).
336. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 8(1) (Eng.).
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Thus, the remedy must be one that the court can normally give,
consequently, awards of damages, 33' and the grant of administrative• • • 338
orders such as declarations or injunctions are thereby ruled be-
yond the criminal courts. One unfortunate result may be multiple
proceedings, whereby a criminal defendant raises rights issues by
way of a defense to the charge, the continuance of the proceeding,
or the production of evidence, while at the same time pursuing
claims in the local civil county court for damages and the High
Court for a declaration of incompatibility.
339
The power to grant appropriate remedies is further circum-
scribed in order to curtail the powers of the judiciary. First, certain
types of conceivable remedies are ruled out entirely. No criminal
offence is created by the Act,340 and one can safely assume that the
judges will not think it proper to create one in common law.4 1
There is no mention of a new constitutional tort, though it is pos-
sible that it will be judicially developed.342 Nor, presumably, can
there be an injunction against the enforcement of an incompatible
law, as that would run contrary to section 4.343 Second, it is not pos-
sible to award damages in response to the good faith failure of a
court to recognize or enforce rights other "than to compensate a
337. Id. § 8(2). Section 8 states that "damages may be awarded only by a court which has
power to award damages, or to order the payment of compensation, in civil proceedings."
Id.
338. See Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 31 (Eng.); Supreme Court Rules, (1977) SI
1955/1776.
339. SeeJane Marriott & Danny Nicol, The Human Rights Act, Representative Standing and
the Victim Culture, 1998 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 730, 741.
340. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 7(8) (Eng.).
341. See, e.g., Shaw v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, 1962 A.C. 220, 233-36 (acknowledging
that the court cannot create a criminal offense for moral indecency at common law, refer-
ring to a long line of cases showing that conspiracy of the same is a criminal offense);
Knuller v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, 1973 A.C. 435, 442 (upholding Shaw but stating that it
is not necessary in the twentieth century for courts to create offenses).
342. See, e.g., Hayes v. Ireland, [1987] 7 I.L.RM. 651, 652 (awarding damages as a result of
the unlawful interference by teachers with a constitutional right); Kennedy v. Ireland, 1987 I.R.
587, 594-95 (awarding damages to plaintiffs whose constitutional rights were violated); Kear-
ney v. Minister forJustice, 1986 I.R. 116, 122 (stating that the state may be liable for acts of a
servant of the state which amount to an infringement of a constitutionally protected right);
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-58 (1978) (stating that while sometimes appropriate, dam-
ages for constitutional torts should be permitted only for compensable damages and not for
every constitutional violation); Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (ruling that violation of the Fourth Amendment by a federal
agent acting under color of authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages). The
Human Rights Act can be said to create a "public law remedy." Sir Robert Carnwath,
ECHR Remedies from a Common Law Perspective, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 517 (2000).
343. But cf. Factortame v. Secretary of State for Transp. (No.2), 3 W.L.R. 818, 826
(1990) (observing that section 4 empowers courts to uphold the primary of rights arising
from community law).
SUMMER 2000]
University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform
person to the extent required by Article 5 (5) of the Convention. ", 44
Claims, which will be paid by the Crown rather than the judge per-
sonally, can only be brought by way of appeal orjudicial review.
Third, the courts must apply such remedies as remain available
in ways that are 'just and appropriate. 346 Presumably, common
remedies in the civil courts will be damages or equitable relief such
as declarations and injunctions. As for the criminal courts, the pos-
sibility of exclusion of evidence will probably arise most
commonly. Here, the Human Rights Act will interact with sections
76 and 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984, 347
which deals with the admissibility of evidence arising from the ex-
ercise of police powers,348 for there is no express guidance in the
Act itself.3 9
Fourth, there are further limits on the award of damages.3 '0 The
court must be satisfied under section 8(3) that
taking account of all the circumstances of the case, includ-
ing-
(a) any other relief or remedy granted, or order made,
in relation to the act in question (by that or any
other court), and
(b) the consequences of any decision (of that or any
other court) in respect of that act....
the award is necessary to afford just satisfaction to the person
in whose favour it is made.
The court must also take account of principles developed by the
European Court of Human Rights under Article 41 of the Conven-
tion in awarding compensation in determining "(a) whether to
344. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 9(3) (Eng.).
345. Id. § 9(1).
346. Id. § 8(l).
347. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, §§ 76, 78 (Eng.).
348. Id.; see also Regina v. Samuel, 2 W.L.R. 920 (C.A. 1988); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
349. See generally David Beatty, The Canadian Charter of Rights, 60 MOD. L. REv. 481
(1997); Jonathan Black-Branch, Entrenching Human Rights Legislation Under Constitutional
Law: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, 1998 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 312; Roland
Penner, The Canadian Experience with the Charter of Rights, 1996 PuB. L. 104. Cf Police and
Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60 (Eng.); Canadian Charter of Rights, 1982, § 24(2) (Can).
350. See Morris Amos, Damages for Breach of the Human Rights Act 1998, 1999 EUR. HUM.
RTS. L. REv. 178.
351. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 8(3) (Eng.).
[VOL. 33:4
The United Kingdom Bill of Rights 1998
,352
award damages, or (b) the amount of an award." The main em-
phasis of the Strasbourg court has been on actual pecuniary
damage, distress, and frustration; conversely, exemplary or aggra-
vated damages are not recognized headings of award in European
Courtjurisprudence
Apart from the relatively narrow rules of standing, the financial
implications of mounting a case under the Act should also be
taken into account. Since there can be no claim to substantial
damages, contingency fees will not be very helpful to potential liti-
gants. In response, the Government at one point considered a
special fund for public interest litigation, but it has since decided
against this. As a result, local legal services commissions are left to
decide the funding priority of rights litigation. This stance may be
problematic, as such issues are often of national, not local, con-
cern. In 1999, however, the Legal Aid Board agreed that the public
interest will be a criterion in its funding code: the applicant for
funding must show that at least twenty people would be helped
and that there is a forty percent chance of success.354
A final procedural difficulty placed in the way of judicial
remedies is the limitation period that is set at one year or such
longer period as the court considers equitable. 55 This period only
applies to proceedings based on the Act itself; where a human
rights argument is simply part of a wider case, then the normal
limitation proceedings apply, though these could be even shorter,
as in the case ofjudicial review.35
6
Despite all of these difficulties, some creativity may be expected.
For example, the courts might be drawn into giving affirmative
remedies, that is, declarations that call for positive action to be
352. Id. § 8(4). Article 41 of the Convention states: "If the Court finds that there has
been a violation of the Convention or the protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the
High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court
shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party." Eleventh Protocol, supra note
179, at art. 41.
353. See Demetriou, supra note 313, at 494 (stating that the level of damages may be
higher under European Community Law).
354. See Dan Bindman, Focus: Legal Aid, L. Soc'y GAZETTE, Apr. 1999, at 22, 25.
355. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 7(5) (Eng.). See generally Danny Nicol, Limitation
Periods Under the Human Rights Act 1998 andJudicial Review, 115 L.Q. REv. 216 (1999).
356. See Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 31 (Eng.); Supreme Court Rules, (1977) SI
1955/1776. According to rule 4, "[a]n application for judicial review shall be made promptly
and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the application first
arose unless the Court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within
which the application shall be made." Id.; see also Regina v. Dairy Produce Quota Trib. ex parte
Caswell, 2 W.L.R. 1320 (Eng. H.L. 1990); Regina v. Stratford on Avon Dist. Council ex parte
Jackson, I W.L.R. 1319 (Eng. CA 1985).
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taken by executive authorities, rather than just negatively con-
demning wrongful action.' 7
Next, the Human Rights Act only provides for a form of ex post
facto review, albeit on a fairly decentralized basis. There would
have been several advantages to having prior review, or, the refer-
ral of Bills to a review court before its final stage of passage (royal
assent). These include the opportunity of a general review rather
than one confined to the facts of a case and a pro-active stance
rather than solely a reactive one. There are also disadvantages, in-
cluding, in absence of controversy, the problem that the facts may
not be clearly or forcefully argued and the uncertainty of the re-
ferral in the system of precedent. Nevertheless, provisions of this
kind already exist in United Kingdom law.358 The Crown can make
references to the Privy Council under the Judicial Committee Act
of 1833, section 4,359 and the facility has been used around half a
dozen times.36° The idea has also made a reappearance in legisla-
tion dealing with devolution to Northern Ireland, Scotland, and
Wales, including the versions in 1998. 36' Where remedies are avail-
able, then the courts will have to think more carefully about
whether a decision concerning rights should have any wider retro-
spective effect. This is important where the statute of limitation is
very short.
362
2. Legislative Remedies-If a declaration of incompatibility is is-
sued by an English court or there is a judgment from the
European Court of Human Rights in response to proceedings in-
357. See generally Michael Supperstone & Jason Coppel, Judicial Review After the Human
Rights Act, 1999 EUR. Hum. RTS. L. REv. 301.
358. The facility is also available under article 26 of the Irish Constitution. SeeJoseph
Jaconelli, Reference of Bills to the Supreme Court-A Comparative Perspective 18 IRISH JURIST 322,
322-23 (1983). Under U.S. constitutional law, however, the courts must hear real "cases and
controversies." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
359. Judicial Committee Act, 1833, c. 41, § 4 (Eng.).
360. See In re Parliamentary Privilege Act, 1770 1958 A.C. 331; In re MacManaway, 1951
A.C. 161 (Eng.); In re PiracyJure Gentium, 1934 A.C. 586 (Eng.); In re Labrador Boundary,
[1927] 43 T.L.R. 289 (Eng.).
361. See Government of Wales Act, 1998, c. 38, § 109 (Eng.); Northern Ireland Act,
1998, c. 47, § 11 (Eng.); Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46, § 33 (Eng.); Scotland Act, 1978, c. 51, § 19
(Eng.); Northern Ireland Constitution Act, 1973, c. 36, § 18 (Eng.); see also HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 275-83, 293-301, 311-13; Alan Miller, Human Rights
and the Scottish Parliament, 1998 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 260, 260.
362. Compare Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 638-40 (1965) (holding that a 1961
Supreme Court decision to bar admission of illegally seized evidence would not apply retro-
actively to state court convictions finalized before the ruling) with Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719, 732-34 (1966) (holding that two previous Supreme Court decisions invalidat-
ing the admission of improperly obtained criminal confessions would not apply
retroactively to cases where the trials began prior to the decisions) and State v. Fawley, 1978
I.R. 326, 331 (holding that the invalidation of the priorjury selection process as unconstitu-
tional did not apply retroactively to invalidate priorjury trials).
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volving the United Kingdom that is perceived as adverse to existing
English legislation,63 there is a fast track procedure to provide a
speedy reform of the law. By section 10(2), "[i]f a Minister of the
Crown considers that there are compelling reasons for proceeding
under this section, he may by order make such amendments to the
legislation as he considers necessary to remove the incompatibil-
ity.064
Although orders are subject to affirmation in Parliament, which
must be allowed sixty days for consideration unless the matter is
expressed as urgent365 and must be accompanied by an explanatory
statement from the relevant Minister, 66 this degree of scrutiny is,
of course, far less than would be the case for an amending Act.
This is itself a very worrying denial of democratic rights.3 67 It is
within the spirit of the Act that responses to deep inconsistencies
between laws and rights are to be reserved for resolution by Par-
liamentary and not by judicial remedy. There is no obligation,
though, placed upon Parliament to consider a declaration of in-
compatibility within a given time limit either in the English or
Strasbourg courts. Nor can it be assumed that, when moved to ac-
tion, Parliament will always take the correct remedial action or that
Parliament is a wiser advocate of rights in comparison to the judi-
ciary. In fact, its record in protecting vulnerable individuals or
minorities is often poor; after all, far more of the cases that have
come before the European Court have arisen out of the applica-
tion of legislation rather than out of common law rules. 63
3. Political Remedies-To try to ensure that problems of incom-
patibility are not created by future legislation, ministers who are
sponsoring new bills will be required before the second reading of
363. See Feldman, supra note 317, at 189 (explaining that this is an extraordinary power
that allows effect to be given to an international obligation that has not otherwise been
incorporated into national law).
364. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 10(2) (Eng.). There are corresponding powers in
relation to the parent Acts of incompatible secondary orders or in relation to the orders
themselves or in relation to prerogative orders. Id. § 10(3)-(5).
365. Id. at sched. 2(2).
366. Id. atsched. 2(5).
367. See Mark Elliott, The Demise of Parliamentary Sovereignty? The Implications for Justifying
Judicial Review, 115 L.Q. REV. 119, 127 (1999); Feldman, supra note 317, at 188; Sir William
Wade, Human Rights and the Judiciary, 1998 EUR. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 520, 531. But see Lord
Cooke, The British Embracement of Human Rights, 1999 EUR. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 243, 254 (stating
that such powers are known as "Henry VIII clauses"). The order may be retrospective but
not so as to impose retrospective criminal penalties, which would itself contravene Article 7
of the Convention. See Human Rights Act, 1998, sched. 2,1 1(4) (Eng.).
368. See generally SUE FARRAN, THE UNITED KINGDOM BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (1996) (cataloguing a wide range of United Kingdom cases arising under
each section of the European Convention on Human Rights).
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the Bill to make a written statement about its compatibility with the
Convention.69 If the Minister indicates any doubt, then this should
lead to close questioning and debate. Previous knowledge of such
a debate will hopefully deter the Minister from sponsoring anti-
liberal measures.
Will this political sanction actually work? Pending the com-
mencement of the Act, the government has begun to follow this
arrangement. In 1998, however, Parliament passed the Criminal
Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Bill in only two days and
brushed aside concerns about the patent breaches of Article 6. 7
At least without the more considered and independent evidence of
a rights select committee or independent commission, Parliament
as an institution can be expected to turn a blind eye to safeguards
for unpopular groups or causes.
CONCLUSION
It would be premature to overestimate the immediate impact of
the Human Rights Act in English law. The Convention rights that
it protects were drafted with English law models in mind, models
in which pragmatism and social compromise are more recurrent
features than principle and libertarianism. What began as a rather
reticent and conservative statement of rights has since been ap-
plied by the European Court of Human Rights with a great deal of
respect for national foibles. Furthermore, the Home Department's
Paper and the Human Rights Act itself are modest, pragmatic, and
expressly respectful of English constitutional traditions. English
369. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 19 (Eng.). By this section:
(1) Minister of the Crown in charge of a Bill in either House of Parliament
must, before Second Reading of the Bill-
(a) make a statement to the effect that in his view the provisions of
the Bill are compatible with the Convention rights ("a statement
of compatibility"); or
(b) make a statement to the effect that although he is unable to
make a statement of compatibility the government nevertheless
wishes the House to proceed with the Bill.
(2) The statement must be in writing and be published in such manner as
the Minister making it considers appropriate."
Id.
It is most unlikely that the courts would strike down an Act of Parliament which has been
passed without the making of a section 19 statement. See, e.g., British Ry. Bd. v. Pickin, 1974
A.C. 765 (H.L. 1973) (holding valid a private Act of Parliament passed without notice to
affected persons).
370. SeeWalker, supra note 219.
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judges are also, in the main, conservative minded. Even the execu-
tive in Whitehall does not exactly face a revolution, for it has long
worked with the Convention and already engages in "Strasbourg
proofing"371 and so does not expect many challenges to succeed or
any major legal reforms to be undertaken to ensure compatibil-
St.372ity.
Nevertheless, one can certainly expect a significant level of in-
terest and challenges based on the Human Rights Act in the
immediate future, and there will even be an expectation on the
part of litigants and indeed the public for some judicial activism,
though not likely to the extent that "the lawyers [will] ... domi-
nate all the debates."3 73 The pattern of applications to the
European Convention institutions themselves is that half relate to
criminal process, and the next most common is family and privacy
issues under Article 8 . This pattern will probably be repeated
under the Human Rights Act. Hence, there will be less of an em-
phasis than would be expected by United States lawyers on
freedom of expression, which is given less priority in the corpora-
tist, crowded societies of western Europe, where privacy is given
more importance.
371. See generally IAN BYNOE & SARAH SPENCER, MAINSTREAMING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
WHITEHALL AND WESTMINSTER (1999); Nicholas Lyell, Whither Strasbourg? Why Britain Should
Think Long and Hard Before Incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights, 1997 EUR.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 132.
372. A process of review was undertaken before October 2000, but little indication of
the deficiencies emerged. See, e.g., Venables v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 24724/94,
24888/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999), available at http://www.echr.coe.int (criminal process in
relation to juveniles); Osman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23452/94, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int (addressing the immunity of police or lawyers from action in neg-
ligence); see also Ian Cram, Automatic Reporting Restrictions in Criminal Proceedings and Article
10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 1998 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 742; Steve
Uglow, Covert Surveillance and the European Convention on Human Rights, 1999 CRIM. L. REV.
287; Executive Setting Jail Tariff Is Breach of Rights, TIMES (London), Dec. 17, 1999, at 49; LAW
COMMISSION, BAIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS, Consultation Paper No. 157 (1999) (focusing on
the criminal process, and rules vulnerable to challenge, for example, the rules as to bail);-
The Association of Chief Police Officers and HM Customs and Excise, Standards in Covert
Law Enforcement Techniques (1999), available at http://www.ncis.co.uk (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The principal legal reform which was under-
taken to seek compatibility with the Human Rights Act was the passage of the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 23 (Eng.), which imposts controls over police surveillance
practices.
373. Ewing, supra note 10, at 79. But see Lord Irvine, Activism and Restraint: Human
Rights and the Interpretative Process, 1999 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 350, 371 (arguing the judici-
ary may build a new human rights policy with the right combination of activism and
restraint).
374. See Neil Rose, Crime Cases Dominate ECHR Bids, L. Soc'y GAZETTE, Feb. 1998, at 10.
See generally GERALD CHAMBERS, PRACTISING HUMAN RIGHTS: UK LAWYERS AND THE EURO-
PEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1998).
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To react to this new workload, judges will need to develop new
approaches. This will not just involve technical judicial review of
administrative action. The judges must now begin to look more at
substance than procedure or strict precedent. This approach is
demanded by the Human Rights Act insofar as it requires the
courts to "take into account" the jurisprudence of the European
Court (which has a purposive approach) and not simply to follow
the rules of judicial review.7 5 This point has also been asserted by
the Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine, who said in December 1997:
This Bill will therefore create a more explicitly moral ap-
proach to decisions and decision making; will promote both a
culture where positive rights and liberties become the focus
and concern of legislators, administrators and judges alike;
and a culture in judicial decision making where there will be
a greater concentration on substance rather than form. 76
It becomes important for the courts to try to articulate some
underlying values guiding their decisions, such as autonomy,
equality, and democracy. Such articulation will form the driving
principles for rights review rather than judicial review. 77 Ultimately
rights review will reveal that English law already resonates with the
values of individual liberty.
375. See Council of Civil Serv. Unions v. Minister for the Civil Serv., 1985 A.C. 374.
376. Tom Sargant Memorial Lecture (Dec. 1997), available at http://www.open.gov.uk/
lcd/speeches/1997/tomsarg.htm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform);
see also Wade, supra note 367, at 532 (declaring the bill "a quantum leap into a new legal cul-
ture of fundamental rights and freedoms").
377. Compare Feldman, supra note 317, at 186 (arguing the basic values of public law in-
clude the principles of the rule of law), with Irvine, supa note 373, at 369 (arguing the
courts have construed an individual's right of access to justice as a "constitutional right").
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